Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The
Cases Dombrowski Forgot
Douglas Laycockt
Dombrowski v. Pfister held that in certain circumstances federal courts could enjoin threatened prosecutions under allegedly
unconstitutional state statutes. This decision has generally been
viewed as a significant but short-lived expansion of federal power.
The conventional wisdom is that such injunctions were made available by Ex parte Young,2 substantially foreclosed by subsequent
developments culminating in Douglas v. City of Jeanette,3 granted
anew by Dombrowski, and greatly restricted once again in Younger
v. Harris.4
The thesis of this article is that Dombrowski actually limited
federal power. Careful review of the pre-Dombrowski precedents
indicates that injunctions against threatened prosecutions issued
routinely and rested on a sound doctrinal basis. What is significant
about Dombrowski is not that an injunction issued, but that the
injunction was treated as exceptional instead of routine and that
new limitations on the availability of injunctions were introduced.
If this thesis is accepted, Dombrowski presents important historical and jurisprudential problems. There is little evidence to suggest that Dombrowski's break with precedent was deliberate, and
even if it were, this would not explain why the decision was widely
received as a great victory for civil libertarians and the social activists of the sixties. In fact, Dombrowski appears to have been a mistake; incredibly, the Court and most of the profession seem to have
overlooked the two preceding decades of Supreme Court practice.
Such a mistake raises questions about the reliability of a legal system that depends on judicial opinions to formulate and transmit
doctrine, and about the proper judicial response to its discovery.
These broad questions have specific implications for the law
currently governing federal prospective relief from unconstitutional
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3 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
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state statutes-injunctions against enforcement or declaratory
judgments of unconstitutionality.' I have argued elsewhere6 that the
Younger doctrine denies prospective relief in situations in which
supposedly adequate criminal remedies are not adequate at all. The
most important of these involve citizens engaged in a continuing
course of conduct who are prosecuted for past violations of an allegedly invalid state law and are unable to get prompt relief or authoritative resolution of their constitutional claims with respect to future
violations. Since, as I will argue here, such undue extensions of
Younger resulted at least in part from a mistaken view of the precedents, a view originating in Dombrowski, the Court has a special
obligation to adjust the Younger doctrine in light of the arguments
and authority previously overlooked.
The first three parts of this article review Dombrowski, the preDombrowski precedents, and the doctrinal effects of Dombrowski's
break with those precedents. Part IV explores the very sketchy evidence available on the question why Dombrowski was decided as it
was. Finally, Part V briefly poses the larger jurisprudential questions raised by judicial mistakes and then considers the implications for the Younger doctrine of a corrected understanding of preDombrowski law.
I. THE CoNvETIoNAL VIEw OF Dombrowski
Dombrowski arose out of a dispute between a civil rights organization and various Louisiana officials. The individual plaintiffs had
been arrested and charged with violating two communist-control
laws. 7 A state court had subsequently quashed the arrest warrants,
but state officials continued to threaten prosecution. The plaintiffs
then filed the federal lawsuit, seeking an injunction against further
proceedings under the two laws. Judge Wisdom, sitting as one member of a three-judge district court, issued a temporary restraining
order. The three-judge court then assembled and, over Judge Wisdom's dissent, vacated the restraining order and dismissed the complaint.' The opinion, citing Douglas v. City of Jeanette,I held that
federal courts should not enjoin state prosecutions in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances not found to be present. Following this
I See Laycock, FederalInterference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective
Relief, 1977 Sup. CT. RsV. 193, 200.
Id. at 199-222.
380 U.S. at 482 n.1.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
319 U.S. 157 (1943).
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decision, the plaintiffs were indicted under one 0 of the two statutes.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding the statute under which
the plaintiffs had been indicted to be an overbroad regulation of
speech" and disposing of four arguments against reaching the merits: Pullman abstention,' 2 the ripeness requirement, the AntiInjunction Act,' 3 and the irreparable injury requirement. Three of
these arguments need not detain us. The Court's treatment of
Pullman abstention,' 4 a postponement of federal jurisdiction if
a state court might by statutory construction obviate the need to
reach a difficult constitutional question, had little immediate impact on the issues involved. The ripeness requirement, which precludes prospective relief unless there is a reasonable prospect that
the challenged law will be enforced, was held met with respect to
only one of the statutes, a remarkably stringent application of the
requirement.'5 The Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits a federal
court from issuing an injunction to stay proceedings that are already
pending in a state court," was construed narrowly and held inapplicable. The Court found that the indictments had not been pending at the time the federal complaint was filed and would not have
been pending at all if Judge Wisdom's restraining order had not
been erroneously vacated. 8 Apparently the state-court proceedings
on the warrants and motions to quash did not count. These three
holdings are of only limited importance to the present analysis, but
their implications will be discussed where relevant in Parts III and
IV.
The heart of Dombrowski, and the concern of this article, is its
treatment of the irreparable injury requirement.'9 The defendants

"

380 U.S. at 488.

" Id. at 492-96.

12 See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Field, The Abstention
Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590 (1977); F.ield, Abstention in ConstitutionalCases:
The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 1071 (1974).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
" 380 U.S. at 489-92 (Pullman abstention inappropriate because statutes so vague and
overbroad that no authoritative constitutional construction could be reached in single case
and because prosecutions were allegedly threatened in bad faith for harassment purposes).
,1Id. at 496 n.13 (reading prosecutor's brief to concede that renewed prosecution was
threatened under statute on which indictments had been based and remanding for consideration of whether arrests were also made pursuant to the other statute). See also id. at 484 n.2
(implying that facts underlying prosecutor's concession were barely sufficient).
" Id. at 484 n.2; see Warren,Federaland State CourtInterference, 43 HARv.L. Rav. 345,
366-78 (1930); Note, FederalPowerto Enjoin State Court Proceedings,74 HARv. L. REv. 726,
728-29 (1961).
' This holding is criticized in Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1109-10 (1977).
380 U.S. at 484 n.2.
" See generally 0. Fiss, THE Cvlu RIGHIS INJUNCION (1978); Laycock, Book Review,
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argued that the plaintiffs' defense to the state prosecution would be
an adequate legal remedy, making federal equity relief unnecessary.
The plaintiffs argued that the state remedy was inadequate to protect their first amendment freedoms. The Court began its analysis
by noting that Ex parte Young-which it called "the fountainhead
of federal injunctions against state prosecutions" 2 -had made relief
generally available to citizens threatened with prosecution under
allegedly unconstitutional laws. The Court went on to say, however,
that since Young, "considerations of federalism have tempered the
exercise of equitable power, for the Court has recognized that federal interference with a state's good-faith administration of its criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent with our federal framework."'2
The Court then cited Douglas v. City of Jeannette22 and four earlier
cases2 in which injunctions had been denied to support the proposition that "[i]t is generally to be assumed that state courts and
prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations as expounded by
this Court, and that the mere possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary to justify a disruption of orderly state proceedings." 24
The Court's review of the relevant precedents ended with
Douglas. If anything had happened to cast doubt on the proposition
that federalism concerns substantially restricted the availability of
prospective relief, the opinion gave no hint of it. The Court proceeded, however, to announce an exception to the Douglas rule for
injunctions against the enforcement of overbroad regulation of
speech. "Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression," and because numerous prosecutions would be
required to work out the constitutional limits of an overbroad statute, defense of a criminal prosecution was not an adequate remedy,
and injunctive relief was therefore appropriate. This exception was
obviously important, especially to the civil rights and antiwar movements of the sixties. Because marches and demonstrations were
among the principal weapons of these movements, many of their
TExAs L. RFv. (forthcoming) (1979).
380 U.S. at 483.
2 Id. at 484 (footnote omitted).
" 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941);
Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240
(1927).
"

380 U.S. at 484-85.
" Id. at 486.
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legal battles raised overbreadth issues. Moreover, a wide range of
official conduct could be portrayed as restricting or inhibiting protected speech and thus brought within the Dombrowski exception
by analogy." If Douglas were indeed the controlling precedent, an
overbreadth exception would have been a major victory for the activist movements.
Commentators have almost uniformly viewed Dombrowski as
such a victory.2 Professor Sedler found Dombrowski "an extremely
important change," for it meant "that frequently federal rights can
be vindicated in the federal district courts. 2 8 To Dean Stickgold,
Dombrowski was a "basic policy change from Douglas and other
more recent first amendment cases. ' 2 A few commentators disagreed, at least in part,3" but their compilations of pre-Dombrowski
28 See, e.g., Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968); Chandler v. Garrison, 286
F. Supp. 191 (E.D. La. 1968); Holt v. Richmond Redev. & Hous. Auth., 266 F. Supp. 397
(E.D. Va. 1966).
27 Bailey, Enjoining State Criminal Prosecutions Which Abridge First Amendment
Freedoms, 3 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 67, 69-91 (1967); Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief
Against the Use of State Criminal ProsecutionsDesigned to Deter the Exercise of Preferred
Constitutional Rights, 13 How. L. REv. 51, 83-85 (1967); Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister:
Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions in Civil Rights Cases-A New Trend in
Federal-StateJudicialRelations, 34 FoRDHAM L. REv. 71, 72-73, 83-86 (1965); Fiss, supra note
17, at 1103-17, 1163-64; Kanowitz, Deciding Federal Law Issues in Civil Proceedings: State
Versus Federal Trial Courts, 3 HASTrNos CONST. L.Q. 141, 166 (1976); Sedler, The
Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social Change: Reflections from Without
and Within, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 237, 244-45, 253-58 (1970); Stickgold, Variations on the
Theme of Dombrowski v. Pfister: FederalIntervention in State Criminal ProceedingsAffecting FirstAmendment Rights, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 369, 380-85; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term,
85 HARv. L. REv. 38, 301-02 (1971); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56,
170-74 (1965); Note, ConstitutionalLaw: LimitationsImposed on TraditionalUse of Doctrine
of Federal JudicialAbstention, 1966 DUKE L.J. 219; Comment, Federal Injunctions Against
State Actions, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 744, 801-04 (1967); Note, HUAC and the "Chilling
Effect": The Dombrowski Rationale Applied, 21 RuTGERS L. REv. 679, 693-95 (1967); Note,
The Dombrowski Remedy-FederalInjunctionsAgainst State Court Proceedings Violative of
Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 92, 122-24 (1966); Note, Constitutional
Law-InjunctionAgainst State Prosecutionof Statutes Attacked for Vagueness, 32 TENN. L.
REv. 641 (1965); Comment, Power to Enjoin Prosecutions Violative of Federally Protected
Rights, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 563-64 (1966).
28 Sedler, supra note 27, at 254.
21 Stickgold, supra note 27, at 383 (footnotes omitted).
30 Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law, and the First Amendment, 49

N.Y.U.L. REv. 740 (1974) (cases denying prospective relief were aberrations, and Dombrowski
a slight retrenchment, but nonetheless a "constitutional watershed" for articulating first
amendment values at stake). See also Maraist, FederalInjunctive Relief Against State Court
Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 Tax. L. REv. 535, 548-52 (1970)
(Dombrowski part of a "civil rights exception" to Douglas, created by lower courts and
impliedly approved by earlier Supreme Court decisions); Whitten, Federal Declaratoryand
Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of
JudicialDiscretion,53 N.C.L. REV. 591, 635-37 (1975) (Dombrowskipart of a period of "loose
restraint").
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cases granting injunctions do not appear to have had significant
influence on the prevailing view.3' In a recent leading article, Professor Fiss wrote of Dombrowski's "revolutionary promise. . . to open
'3' 2
the doors that had long been kept shut by Douglas.
These views rely, of course, on Dombrowski's statements regarding prior doctrine. A detailed review of the pre-Dombrowski
precedents indicates that this reliance is misplaced.

II.
A.

THE

PRE-Dombrowski PRECEDENTS

Young to Douglas

1. The Young Dilemma. Ex parte Young provided the first
detailed analysis of the inadequacy of the criminal defense as a
remedy for persons subject to an unconstitutional statute. 3 3 That
remedy left the citizen in a dilemma: he could comply with the law
and forgo his allegedly constitutional conduct, or defy the law and
test its validity in a criminal case at the risk of criminal penalties
of his constitutional claim were rejected. The need to make this
choice, which will be referred to as the Young dilemma, can be
eliminated only if the citizen is permitted to secure a judicial decision on his constitutional claim before engaging in the conduct the
statute seeks to proscribe.
Providing relief from the Young dilemma has been at the heart
of legislative and judicial policy in this area throughout the century.34 Congress early on made special provision for Young-based
injunctions in the Three-Judge Court Act" and later provided an
alternative remedy in the Declaratory Judgment Act. 3 The legislative history of the latter makes clear that Congress accepted the
basic premise first elaborated in Young and later championed by
Professor Borchard 3 -a person should not have to risk penalties
to learn his rights.38 More importantly for our purposes, this same
31See B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTTUTrIONAL LAW 30-31 (2d ed. 1978); Fiss, supra note 17.
32

Fiss, supra note 17, at 1116.

209 U.S. at 161-68. Earlier cases are presented in Warren, supra note 16, at 373;
Wechsler, supra note 30, at 743-62.
31See D. CURIE, FEDERAL CoURTs 746 (2d ed. 1975).
" Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281
(1970)) (repealed 1976).
3628 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1976).
17E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 764-801 (2d ed. 1941); E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 341-49 (1st ed. 1934); Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L.J. 445 (1943).
u H.R. REP. No. 1264, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S.REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934). The history of this act is reviewed in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 465-68 (1974),
3
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insight accounts for an almost unbroken line of pre-Dombrowski
Supreme Court cases granting prospective relief to persons facing
the Young dilemma."
These precedents make little mention of three distinctions that
became the focus of sharp debate in the post-Dombrowski era: the
distinctions between injunctions and declaratory judgments, 40 between criminal and civil proceedings,41 and between cases with and
cases without pending enforcement proceedings.2 Indeed, many of
the pre-Dombrowski opinions do not state enough facts to permit
categorization in terms of these distinctions. Those that do generally involve suits for injunctions4 3 against criminal enforcement proceedings4 4 that are not yet pending.45 In terms of the Young dilemma, however, such classifications involve only minor variations
on the basic paradigm of citizens seeking prospective relief to avoid
the risk of penalties. These variations will not be discussed until the
examination of Dombrowski's consequences in Part III.
2. The Douglas Dictum. In the period following Ex parte
Young, the Young dilemma was frequently explained,4" and the
Young remedy even more frequently applied. 47 From Young to

Douglas, the Supreme Court decided by opinion at least ninety-four
cases seeking injunctions against enforcement of state statutes. In
thirty-three of these cases, the injunction issuedA Forty-two injuncand Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-15, 125 n.16 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
3,See text and notes at notes 46-144 infra.
'" See text and notes at notes 192-199 infra. See also Fiss, supra note 17, at 1121-25, 114360.
" See Fiss, supranote 17, at 1136-38; Note, Younger Grows Older: Equitable Abstention
in Civil Proceedings,50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 870 (1975).
" See text and notes at notes 200-207 infra. See also Fiss, supranote 17, at 1125-27, 113036, 1139-43.
" For an exception, see City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
" For exceptions, see Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1948) and cases
cited in Wechsler, supra note 30, at 795 n.224.
Is For exceptions, see cases cited in note 201 infra.
" See cases collected in Laycock, supra note 5, at 197 n.32.
"
More detailed reviews of this period may be found in Soifer & MacGill, The Younger
Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TFx. L. REv. 1141, 1148-63 (1977); Wechsler,
supra note 30, at 762-822.
4s Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Gibbs v.
Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc. 306 U.S. 375 (1939); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field
Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177 (1933); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210
(1932); Cudahy Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S.
235 (1929); Hopkins v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 275 U.S. 393 (1928); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.,
274 U.S. 445 (1927); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926); Connally v. General
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tions were denied on the merits,49 and six cases were remanded for
further factual development." Because the federal court decided the
constitutional merits under each of these dispositions, each is inconsistent with the view that the merits should be left to state courts
in enforcement proceedings. Another six cases were dismissed for
procedural
reasons,5' and two because plaintiff faced-no risk of pros2
5

ecution.

Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Real Silk
Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925);
Michigan Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier,
266 U.S. 555 (1925); Air-Way Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71 (1924); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co.,
258 U.S. 50 (1922); Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 288 (1921);
Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915);
Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914); Adams Express Co. v. New York, 232 U.S. 14
(1914); Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474 (1913); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913);
Herndon v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 218 U.S. 135 (1910); Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
216 U.S. 146 (1910); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
" Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941); Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939);
Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938); Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S.
258 (1937); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936); A. Magnano
Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527
(1931); Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66 (1930); Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney,
276 U.S. 124 (1928); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Ry., 273 U.S. 45 (1927); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266
U.S. 497 (1925); Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U.S. 370 (1924); Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S.
140 (1924); ,Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923);
Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922); Walls v.
Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919); Van Dyke
v. Geary, 244 U.S. 39 (1917); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux
Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917);
McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344 (1917); Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917); Tanner
v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342 (1916); Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916); Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576 (1914); Allen v. St. Louis, I.M.
& S. Ry., 230 U.S. 553 (1913); Southern Pac. Co. v. Campbell, 230 U.S. 537 (1913); Oregon
R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Campbell, 230 U.S. 525 (1913); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Conley,
230 U.S. 513 (1913); Hampton v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 227 U.S. 456 (1913); Savage v.
Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). See
also Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 527 (1926) (alternative holding).
" Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5 (1938); Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S.
194 (1934); Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923); Detroit United Ry. v. City of
Detroit, 248 U.S. 429 (1919); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Andrews, 216 U.S. 165 (1910).
11 Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 298 U.S. 226 (1936) (plaintiff lacked standing);
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934) (insufficient amount in controversy); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1928) (exhaustion of state remedies required in rate
cases); Henderson Water Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 269 U.S. 278 (1925) (same); Pullman
Co. v. Croom, 231 U.S. 571 (1913) (appeal abated by death of party); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908) (exhaustion of state remedies required in rate cases).
" Moor v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 297 U.S. 101 (1936) (shipper sought injunction ordering
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The remaining five cases are the five Dombrowski cited to illustrate the "rule" that cases seeking such injunctions should normally
be dismissed without reaching the merits because a state,enforcement proceeding would provide an adequate remedy. Although the
language of the five cases-which will be referred to as the Douglas
dictum-strongly suggests such a rule,5 3 none of the cases squarely
so holds.5 4 Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge 5 comes the closest,

but is limited by the Court's reliance on the plaintiff's failure to
allege how it would be injured by compliance or to dispute the
prosecutor's avowed intention to bring only a single test prosecution.5 6 Fenner v. Boykin57 actually affirmed a decision on the merits
of a motion for preliminary injunction. In Beal v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad,58 a diversity case in which the railroad alleged that a concededly constitutional statute was being misconstrued by a state
prosecutor, the Court emphasized that only a state court could authoritatively resolve the controversy and that the state had prom-5

ised it would bring only a single test prosecution. Watson v. Buck

1

held prospective relief unavailable with respect to some sections of
the challenged statute, but reached the merits of the plaintiff's
challenge to the most important section without explaining why it
was different from the others. Finally, in Douglas v. City of
Jeannette,"° the plaintiffs were not required to risk further penalties
to exercise their first amendment rights because the challenged ordinance was held unconstitutional in the companion case of
Murdock v. Pennsylvania.6 1 Since there was no reason to believe
that the state prosecutor and courts would not adhere to the Court's
ruling in Murdock, the plaintiffs no longer faced the Young dilemma, prospective relief was unnecessary, and federal interference
inappropriate.

6

1

railroad to violate statute regulating railroad); Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272
U.S. 525, 527-29 (1926) (no penalty for violation of statute) (alternative holding; statute also
sustained,on merits).
0 Cf. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 98-100 (1949) (stating "rule" that injunctions against federal prosecution normally will not issue, but authorizing injunction on
routine showing of Young dilemma); Wechsler, supra note 30, at 784-85 (noting that, even
after exception swallowed rule, pre-Douglas Court often described relief from Young dilemma
as exception to general rule forbidding prospective relief).
51See D. CURRIE, supra note 34, at 746-48.
295 U.S. 89 (1935).
On the problems with such promises, see Laycock, supra note 5, at 211-12.
7 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
312 U.S. 45 (1941).
313 U.S. 387 (1941).
319 U.S. 157 (1943).
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
62 319 U.S. at 165.
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These are the five cases that Dombrowski maintained had substantially modified Young and its scores of uncited progeny. If
Young had been modified, one would expect to find that injunctive
relief became relatively unavailable in the years following Douglas.
But this is not what happened.
B.

The Forgotten Precedents

1. The Battle over Douglas. Even in the early forties, the dominant line of cases freely granting injunctions did not die out. On
the day that Beal was decided, the Court enjoined enforcement of
a state alien registration law without making any reference to Beal
or suggesting that any special showing of the need for prospective
relief was required or had been made. 3 Between Watson v. Buck
and Douglas, two requests for injunctions against state enforcement
proceedings were denied on the merits. The first case 4 did not refer
to the remedies issue, but in the second, 5 the Court summarily
rejected the defendants' contention that the plaintiff's opportunity
to raise his constitutional claim as a defense in the enforcement
proceeding afforded him an adequate remedy.
Following Douglas, the Court continued to give conflicting signals. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,7 it
enjoined state enforcement proceedings without making any reference to the Douglas line of cases. Another opinion referred to "the
traditional use of equity proceedings to enjoin criminal proceedings." 8 But in three other-opinions, the Douglas dictum was restated, each time in sweeping terms and in further dictum.
Douglas was also cited as an alternative ground for decision in one
affirmance without opinion. 70 These conflicting indications apparently represented real division on the Court. Although the Douglas
dictum appeared six times in the early forties, all of these opinions
were written by only two Justices: two were written by Justice
Black" and four, including Douglasitself, by Chief Justice Stone. 72

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
* Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
Id. at 349-50.
' 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
' Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 306 (1943).
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S.
228, 235 (1943); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333 n.29 (1943).
Ryan v. Thompson, 324 U.S. 821 (1945).
" Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333 n.29 (1943); Watson y. Buck, 313 U.S. 387,
400-02 (1941). But see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (Black, J., for the Court)
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This division came into the open and was resolved against the
Douglas dictum in AFL v. Watson,7" a result reinforced two years
later-after Chief Justice Stone's death-by a unanimous Court in
74
Toomer v. Witsell.
In AFL v. Watson, various unions and employers sought to
enjoin civil and criminal enforcement of a right-to-work amendment
to the Florida constitution. The Court responded with a two-part
holding. First, it held that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient irreparable injury to justify prospective relief. It then ordered Pullman
abstention, directing the district court to retain jurisdiction and
indicating that that court was free to issue preliminary injunctions.75 The Court seemed to contemplate that most prosecutions
would be enjoined while the state-law questions were resolved in one
76
or more test cases.
Chief Justice Stone's solitary dissent squarely posed the
Douglas issue. He acknowledged the full implications of the dictum,
reading it to mean that forfeiture of rights because of fear of prosecution was a wrong without a remedy and no basis for an injunction
against enforcement.7 7 The Watson majority clearly did not accept
Chief Justice Stone's view. The majority opinion quoted Douglas on
the need for "irreparable injury which is clear and imminent," and
called this "a strict test. '78 But it did not quote any of the key
sentences about enforcement proceedings providing adequate remedies.7 More importantly, Watson's reasoning was fundamentally
inconsistent with Douglas. The Douglas dictum had focused on the
consequences of the plaintiff's violation of the challenged law: violation would bring prosecution and an adjudication of the constitutional issue. The majority in Watson focused instead on the conse(enjoining enforcement of state alien registration law).
" Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S.
228, 235 (1943); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162-63 (1943); Beal v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 49-51 (1941). But see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1943)
(Stone, C.J., for the Court) ("The majority of the Court is also of opinion that the suit is
within the equity jurisdiction of the Court since the complaint alleges and the evidence shows
threatened irreparable injury to respondent's business").
73 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
74334 U.S. 385 (1948).
11 327 U.S. at 595 n.10; accord, Babbitt v. UFW, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 2316 n.18 (1979);
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1959).
327 U.S. at 599.
Id. at 600 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444
(1944) (Stone, C.J.) (dictum) (validity of most penal statutes "can be deterinined only by
running the risk of violation").
" 327 U.S. at 593.
79 Id.
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quences of compliance. Compliance would cause injuries that could
not be measured in money: "disruption in collective bargaining...
'8
loss in bargaining position . . . decrease in union membership.
Since the cost of compliance could not be measured in money, no
legal remedy was adequate.
This focus on compliance makes sense only in terms of the
Young dilemma, while Douglas's focus on violation would make
sense only if the Young dilemma did not exist. Douglas ignored the
uncertainty that gives rise to the Young dilemma. Its approach
would be sound only if every citizen were so confident in his constitutional judgment that he would risk penalties by violating invalid
statutes and so accurate that he would never actually incur penalties by violating valid ones. In contrast, the argument of the Watson
majority-that citizens would forgo their asserted rights despite
the resulting irreparable injury-assumes that the risk of penalties
would be a deterrent. It pointed to the existing threats of prosecution only to show the reality of the risk that induced compliance;8 '
defense of such prosecutions was not a potential remedy.2 In short,
Watson treated the Young dilemma as very real indeed and gave
relief accordingly.
Toomer v. Witsell 3 completed the restoration of Ex parte
Young. In Toomer, plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of South
Carolina laws requiring out-of-state fishermen either to pay local
taxes and license fees and use South Carolina port facilities or to
stay out of South Carolina waters. A unanimous Court rejected the
defendants' argument84 that the Douglas line of cases barred prospective relief:
It is also clear that compliance . . . would have required
payment of large sums of money for which South Carolina
provides no means of recovery, that defiance would have carried with it the risk of heavy fines and long imprisonment, and
that withdrawal from further fishing until a test case had been
taken through the. South Carolina courts and perhaps to this
Court would have resulted in a substantial loss of business for
85
which no compensation could be obtained.
"Id. at 594.
, Id. at 595.
" See id. at 594 n.9 ("The inadequacy of relief at law is measured by the character of
the relief afforded by the federal not the state courts.").
334 U.S. 385 (1948).
Brief for Appellees at 22, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
334 U.S. at 391-92.
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This is a straightforward description of the Young dilemma. The
two alternatives to risking penalties-paying fees or withdrawing
from South Carolina waters-were merely alternative means of
compliance. Toomer thus went beyond Watson in two ways. First,
the risk-of-penalties branch of the Young dilemma was once again
made explicit. Second, it held that even when the cost of compliance can be measured in money, the legal remedy is inadequate
unless the state has waived its immunity from suit. This holding
was important since few states were likely to acknowledge liability
for consequential damages caused by compliance with invalid statutes.
There are few prospective challenges to statutes that could not
be brought under the Toomer standard. Its analysis of the Young
dilemma would apply to any statute carrying penalties, for compliance always costs something and defiance is never risk-free. Conceivably, the decision leaves room for a line-drawing argument: a
statute with only token penalties might be distinguished from the
"heavy fines and long imprisonment" referred to in Toomer5 6 But
no such argument emerged in the later case law; to the contrary, the
Court subsequently entertained a prospective challenge to a statute
carrying a $100 -fine7 and indicated a willingness to decide, after
Pullman abstention, a prospective challenge to a statute imposing
a $4 fine.8 8 These are the correct results in light of the Young dilemma. No penalty is token when multiplied by sufficient offenses,
and most plaintiffs seeking prospective relief are engaged in continuing conduct involving repeated violation.89 Moreover, any criminal conviction carries a stigma that adds to the deterrent effect of
the stated penalty. Accordingly, any line-drawing argument would
be spurious. Nor were Toomer's implications limited by its dismissal of the plaintiffs' challenge to the South Carolina income
tax. 0 The plaintiffs could pay under protest and sue in the state
court for a refund. That remedy did not expose the plaintiffs to any
risk of penalties, and the Tax Injunction Act" required them to use
Id. at 392.
Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 589 (1961).
Id. at 585-86, 589. See also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); id. at 171-72 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (prosecutor's promise to bring only a single mandamus proceeding to compel
compliance until constitutional issue resolved treated as irrelevant by majority). But see Beal
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S.
89, 96 (1935).
" See Laycock, supra note 5, at 207.
334 U.S. at 392.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
6
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it. In short, Toomer's reasoning fully repudiates the Douglas dictum. Its only ambiguity is that this consequence was left implicit:
Douglas was not cited.
2. IrreparableInjury after Toomer. After AFL v. Watson and
Toomer, injunctions against threatened enforcement of state statutes again issued routinely. In the twenty-two years from Douglas
to Dombrowski, the Court ordered or affirmed at least fifty-six district court injunctions or declaratory judgments preventing enforcement of state constitutions, statutes, or local ordinances. To be sure,
many of these laws-those relating to voting rights,9 2 school administration, 3 and public employment" 4-would not ordinarily have
been enforced by judicial proceedings, so that Douglas was not directly implicated. Moreover, those in which the United States was
the plaintiff 5 can perhaps be explained away as special treatment
for the sovereign, 98 even though the Court itself has never offered
such an explanation. There remain, however, twenty-one cases in
which the Court enjoined state enforcement proceedings against
" Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19, aff'g
mem., Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964); Hill v.
Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964); Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964); Williams v. Moss,
378 U.S. 558 (1964); Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377
U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964);
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Martin
v. Bush, 376 U.S. 222 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Anderson v. Martin,
375 U.S. 399 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960); Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933, aff'g mem., 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949).
,1 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, 368 U.S. 515 (1962), aff'g mem.,
197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961); Legislature of La. v. United States, 367 U.S. 908, aff'g
mem., Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 191 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La. 1961); Orleans Parish
School Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569 (1961), aff'g mem., 188 F. Supp. 916 and 187 F. Supp. 42
(E.D. La. 1960); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 364 U.S. 500 (1960); Faubus v. Aaron,
361 U.S. 197, aff'g mem., Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark. 1959); State
Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959), aff'g mem., 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La.
1958); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
" Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
'5 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963); Lassiter v. United States, 371 U.S. 10
(1963), aff'g mem., 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. La. 1962); Public Util. Comm'n v. United States,
355 U.S. 534 (1958); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943).
," See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1979) (United
States exempt from requirements of Younger v. Harris); cf. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 220, 224-26 (1957) (United States exempt from Anti-Injunction Act); United
States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 269-89 (1947) (United States exempt from Norris-LaGuardia
Act) (alternative holding); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892) (United States
exempt from sovereign-immunity defense). But cf. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352
U.S. 220. 228-30 (1957) (United States not exempt from Pullman abstention).
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federal plaintiffs or prevented such proceedings by declaring the
statute invalid. This latter group of cases was not merely, as one
commentator has suggested, 9' a civil rights exception to Douglas.
Ten cases did involve racial discrimination, 8 and one was a free
speech case. 9 But nine struck down economic regulation"' and one
voided a state tax.101 Moreover, there were at least sixteen additional
cases in which the Court failed to grant prospective relief for reasons
other than irreparable injury-cases in which, contrary to the
Douglas dictum, the Court resolved the constitutional merits0 2 or
03
authorized their resolution in federal court on remand.
Although the Court did not discuss the irreparable injury issue
at length after Toomer, it alluded to it or closely related issues with
sufficient frequency to negate any argument that the requirement
was simply overlooked for two decades. In Spector Motor Service,
Inc. v. O'Connor,04 for example, the Court applied traditional
irreparable injury doctrine without mentioning Douglas. The Court
enjoined collection of a state income tax despite the Tax Injunction
Act' 15 and a newly created state remedy, invoking the old equity rule
11Maraist, supra note 30, at 548-52.
11 City of New Orleans v. Barthe, 376 U.S. 189 (1964), aff'g mem., 219 F. Supp. 788 (E.D.
La. 1963); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369
U.S. 350 (1962); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962); Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S.
11, affg mem., Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961); Tugwell
v..Bush, 367 U.S. 907, aff'g mem., Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.
La. 1961); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903, affg mem., 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350
U.S. 879, vacating mem., 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955); Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877, aff'g mem., 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
" West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
10 Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Ammex Warehouse Co., 378 U.S. 124
(1964), aff'g mem., 224 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S.
361 (1964); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520 (1959); City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc.,
366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley,
366 U.S. 582 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Williamson v.
Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220
(1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
103 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.
v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S.
73 (1960); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (after Pullman abstention); Evers v.
Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958); Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S.
582 (1946) (after Pullman abstention).
101 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). See generally Comment, The Tax Injunction Act and Suits
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that legal remedies that first become available after the equity suit
is filed are irrelevant to the irreparable injury question.'"' In Doud
v. Hodge," the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over a
suit for prospective relief. 0 8 The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the district court enjoined enforcement of the statute, noting
the risk of penalties and cost of compliance, and relying on Toomer
v. Witsell.'0 The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the irreparable
injury argument "adequately disposed of in the opinion of the District Court.""' 0
In Evers v. Dwyer," a black plaintiff had been threatened with
arrest for sitting in the front of a bus. He left the bus to avoid arrest
and then sued to enjoin enforcement of the statute requiring him to
sit in the rear. The district court dismissed for want of an actual
controversy, but the Supreme Court reversed, saying that the plaintiff need not risk arrest to create a controversy. The irreparable
injury issue was not addressed, but the implication for the Douglas
dictum was obvious: if the plaintiff need not be arrested to challenge
the statute, he need not challenge it in an enforcement proceeding.
Evers was so read by the district court in one of the Sunday closing
cases, Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc. v. Gallagher."2 Although
the irreparable injury issue was briefed on appeal in Crown
Kosher,"' the Supreme Court went directly to the merits without
discussing that issue or the district court's treatment of Evers."'
One week after Dombrowski, the Court cited Evers as an exception
to Douglas's rule against prospective relief." 5
Part of the irreparable injury issue was addressed in another
Sunday closing case, Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley."' The plaintiff
had alleged that the Sunday law established religion and was being
discriminatorily enforced by the incumbent prosecutor. A new prosecutor took office, and the plaintiff did not claim that discriminafor Monetary Relief, 46 U. Cm.L. Rsv. 736 (1979).
1- 340 U.S. 602, 605 (1951) (citing American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215
(1937) and Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U.S. 288, 296 (1921)). See Laycock, supra
note 5, at 224-25.
20 350 U.S. 485 (1956).
" Doud v. Hodge, 127 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Ill. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 485, 487 (1956).
l Doud v. Hodge, 146 F. Supp. 887, 890 (N.D. Ill. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957).
1" 354 U.S. 457, 470 (1957).
I
358 U.S. 202 (1958).
2 176 F. Supp. 466, 471 (D. Mass. 1959), rev'd on the merits, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
"

Brief for Appellants at 38-42, Crown Kosher Super Mkt. Inc. v. Gallagher, 366 U.S.

617 (1961); Brief for Appellees at 25, id.

"IGallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
I
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 19 (1965).
"'

366 U.S. 582 (1961).
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tory enforcement would continue. Nevertheless, it denied that its
discriminatory enforcement claim was moot, because prosecutions
initiated by the former prosecutor were still pending against its
employees. The Supreme Court held that defense of those prosecutions was an adequate remedy for the discriminatory enforcement
claim, but proceeded to the merits of the establishment claim."'
This disposition of the claims is consistent with Toomer and inconsistent with the Douglas dictum. Because nondiscriminatory enforcement could continue, the plaintiff faced the Young dilemma of
risking further penalties or forfeiting its establishment clause rights,
at least until one of the pending criminal cases was finally decided, ' and perhaps longer.' But there was no such dilemma with
respect to the discriminatory enforcement claim: the risk of such
enforcement was past. Although the Court did not explain how it
reached the merits of the establishment claim, its enforcement of
the irreparable injury requirement in the context of the discriminatory enforcement claim suggests that that requirement was not overlooked.
Finally, there was the Florida avocado litigation. Plaintiffs
challenged a California law prohibiting importation of avocados
containing less than eight percent oil, a requirement alleged to have
a discriminatory impact on Florida avocados. Avocados were inspected at the state border, and nonconforming shipments were
declared a nuisance. The district court originally dismissed the suit
because the plaintiffs sold their rejected shipments elsewhere rather
than allow them to be seized so that the commerce clause issue
could be litigated in a state-court nuisance proceeding.' 0 This
sounds like deference to state remedies, but the court described its
holding as resting on lack of an actual controversy. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding it irrelevant that state remedies had not
been tried first.'2
On remand, the district court expressed its opinion that insufficient irreparable injury had been shown and that Pullman abstention was appropriate.' 2 But it construed the Supreme Court's opinion as requiring it to decide the merits, and it did so, upholding the
,, Id. at 588-89.
See Laycock, supra note 5, at 202-14.
' See id. at 214-19.
20 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 169 F. Supp. 774 (N.D. Cal. 1958),
rev'd, 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
2I Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1960).
1' Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 197 F. Supp. 780,784 (N.D. Cal. 1961),
rev'd in part, on the merits, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
"'
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statute. As an alternative ground for affirmance, the state officials
argued "that there was insufficient showing of injury to the Florida
growers to invoke the district court's equity jurisdiction." ' 3 In a
second opinion, the Court rejected that contention. It agreed with
the district court's reading of its earlier opinion and independently
concluded that compliance with the statute by shipping rejected
fruit elsewhere would amount to irreparable injury. 21 On the merits,
the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
These opinions, together with the numerous decisions granting
prospective relief without raising the issue, strongly suggest that
Young and Toomer were the law, and that the Douglas dictum was
not. There was no contrary line of cases; the Court did not invoke
Douglas to deny prospective relief in some cases and not in others
according to a hidden agenda of its own. But neither did it explicitly
overrule or limit Douglas. In fact, Douglas continued to be cited
from time to time.
Many of these citations to Douglas are plainly irrelevant to the
issues here, rs but at times the Court cited the dictum as if it were
still good law. The most important of these citations appear in a line
of cases in~olving requests for federal injunctions preventing the
admission of improperly obtained evidence in state criminal
trials. 21 These cases presented considerations quite different from
those of Young and Douglas.In particular, the federal plaintiffs had

12Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 157 (1963).
1

Id. at 157-58.

Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 561 n.2 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (first amendment applies to states); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
200 n.19 (1962) (no jurisdictional amount required under 28 U.S.C. § 1343); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (definition of "color of law"); id. at 191 n.50 (overruling Douglas's
holding that municipalities can be used under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); id. at 206, 213 n.19 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part) (definition of "color of law"); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
530 (1958) (Black, J., concurring) (first amendment applies to states); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 444 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing his own
concurring opinion in Douglas that the first amendment does not immunize "mob movements"); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 304 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (racial discrimination in grand jury selection could be remedied by federal injunction); Terminiello v. City
of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 30 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("cities may not protect the
streets. . .from the aggressions of organized bands"); Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing his own concurring opinion in
Douglas that municipal power should not be restricted lightly); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing his own concurring opinion in Douglas
that Court had given unreasonable protection to religion); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
548 n.1 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (first amendment has been applied); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring) (list of Jehovah's Witness cases).
121 Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 397 (1963); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961);
Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 385 (1961); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 221 (1956)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951).
1
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no need for prospective relief because their evidentiary claim could
be presented in the state criminal court without repeating their
violation or otherwise exposing themselves to additional risk. Moreover, federal interference with evidentiary rulings in a state trial
would have split control of the trial between two courts, a result
more disruptive than enjoining initiation of the state proceeding.
Douglas was thus not implicated in any of these cases. Yet in
three of them,1 27 the Court spoke generally of equitable restraint
with respect to criminal prosecutions, cited Douglas, and restated
its dictum in sweeping terms. Justice Douglas, on the other hand,
in a dissenting opinion to another of these cases, 28 noted that
"[i]njunction against the commencement of state court criminal
proceedings has long been the first line of defense for federally secured rights, ' 12 citing Douglas but apparently only as an unexplained deviation from the general rule. 30
Four other references to Douglas deserve mention. Bailey v.
Patterson3 1 involved a challenge to Mississippi laws requiring racial
segregation of plane, train, and bus stations. Some three hundred
state prosecutions were pending 3 2 when three blacks who had not
been prosecuted sought a federal injunction on behalf of a large
class, including the black defendants in the state prosecutions. A
three-judge district court ordered Pullman abstention. The plaintiffs appealed and asked the Supreme Court to stay the prosecutions
pending appeal. The Court refused in a one-paragraph per curiam
opinion. First it commented that such a stay would be an extraordinary remedy, with citations, introduced by "cf.," to Douglas and
Young. Then it said there was a serious standing question since the
class representatives had not been prosecuted.
That the Court's cryptic citation to Douglas and Young was not
intended to revive the Douglas dictum is clear from its ultimate
disposition of the appeal.13 The Court concluded that the class rep'27
Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 397 (1963); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 385
(1961); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951).
121Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961).
'2 Id. at 462 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
3I Id. See also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 690 (1949)
(Vinson, C.J., for the Court) ("injunctions against the threatened enforcement of unconstitutional statutes are familiar examples of" relief not barred by sovereign immunity) (dictum).
131368 U.S. 346 (1961).
132Bailey v. Patterson, -199 F. Supp. 595, 612 (S.D. Miss. 1961) (Rives, J., dissenting).
For contemporary accounts of this litigation, see B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGirT
63-84 (1964); Lusky, Racial Discriminationand the FederalLaw: A Problem in Nullification,
63 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1163, 1179-80 (1963).
1- 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
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resentatives had standing to challenge future enforcement of the
segregation statutes and that the state's defense was so frivolous
that a single district judge could issue the injunction. The two
Bailey opinions make sense in terms of the Young dilemma. With
respect to the future events at issue on appeal, the plaintiffs faced
the choice of risking penalties or forfeiting rights. But the motion
for stay had been directed only to pending prosecutions, which could
be defended without repeating the violation and thus increasing the
risk of penalties. Bailey was thus consistent with" Young and
Toomer.
In Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po,' 34 the Court relied on
Douglas and refused to interfere with a territorial statute restricting
the teaching of foreign languages. The Court emphasized that the
statute could be enforced only by injunction, that the plaintiffs had
"no reason to fear a court of equity,"' 35 and that the "lack of coercion
by fine or imprisonment" was "important" to its decision.' 36 Even
so, the plaintiffs faced a dilemma similar to the Young dilemma:
they could not provoke an enforcement proceeding without opening
schools and could not open schools without spending substantial
sums of money that could not be recovered if the statute were upheld. At one point the Court "assume[d]" that the plaintiffs would
face irreparable injury,' 3' but that assumption is inconsistent with
its insistence that the plaintiffs had nothing to fear and would be
"fully protected" in the territorial equity courts.' 38 It held "as a
matter of. . . discretion" that no injunction should issue to prevent
3
equity proceedings to enforce an unconstrued territorial statute.' 1
Stainback might plausibly be construed as an actual application of
the Douglas dictum. But the distinction of statutes carrying coercive penalties suggests that the Court genuinely viewed Stainback
as a special case not presenting a true Young dilemma-that it
considered the risk of spending money that might turn out to be
wasted qualitatively different from the risk of penalties.
In a third case, St. John v. Wisconsin Employment Relation
Board,110 the Court squarely applied the narrow holding of
Douglas.'4 ' The Court struck down the challenged statute in a com,' 336 U.S. 368 (1949).
' Id. at 383.
' Id. at 373.
,3 Id. at 381-82.
' Id. at 383.
135

Id.

+ 340 U.S. 411, 414-15 (1951).
"' See text and notes at notes 60-62 supra.
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panion case 42 arising on direct appeal from a state enforcement
proceeding, and consequently found no need to issue an injunction.
Finally, in Fay v. Noia43 the Court cited Douglas to illustrate the
distinction between rights and remedies, a reference consistent with
either a broad or narrow reading.
Careful research has not disclosed a single case in the Supreme
Court during the twenty-two year period from Douglas to
Dombrowski in which the Douglas dictum was unambiguously applied to deny prospective relief in the face of threatened enforcement proceedings. Stainback comes the closest and would be a clear
exception but for the emphasis on the equitable nature of the enforcement proceedings. After 1949, the Douglas dictum survived in
only three or four bits of dicta,' while holding after holding went
the other way.
The lower courts responded to these developments with considerable confusion. Some concluded that Douglas had been modified;'45 some read it narrowly;' 4 1 some simply ignored it;'47 some gave
142Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
14 372 U.S. 391, 427 (1963).
" See cases cited in note 127 supra & note 260 infra.
, Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Wood, 295
F.2d 772, 782-84 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962); Morrison v. Davis, 252
F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F.
Supp. 556, 579-83 (E.D. La. 1964) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Bailey
v. Patterson, 199 F. Supp. 595, 615-16 (S.D. Miss. 1961) (Rives, J., dissenting), vacated, 369
U.S. 31 (1962).
Corsican Prods. v. Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1964); Baines v. City of
Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 591-96 (4th Cir. 1964) (en'banc), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1965);
Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1963); Reid v. City of Norfolk, 179 F. Supp. 768,
771-73 (E.D. Va. 1960); Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc. v. Gallagher, 176 F. Supp. 466, 471
(D. Mass 1959), rev'd on the merits, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); International Longshoremen's Union
v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65, 106-12 (D. Hawaii 1949), rev'd, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951).
"17 Poole v. Barnett, 336 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1964); Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 205
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964); Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649,
652-53 (5th Cir. 1963); Baines v. City of Danville, 321 F.2d 643 (4th Cir. 1963) (injunction
pending appeal), modified, 337 F.2d 579 (1964) (en banc) (final disposition), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 939 (1965); United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 11, modified on othergrounds,
320 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1963); Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961); City of
Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960); Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780, 787
(5th Cir. 1958); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. City of Chicago, 240 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1957), aff'd,
357 U.S. 77 (1958); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955), vacated on other
grounds mem., 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore City, 220 F.2d 386 (4th
Cir. 1955), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Board of Trade v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
156 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1946), rev'd in part, on the merits, sub nom. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 224 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1963), aff'd mem., 378 U.S. 124 (1964); Barthe v. City
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it lip service but decided prospective-relief cases on the merits anyway.' Some concluded that Douglas did not apply to cases involving "vital" or "fundamental human liberties.""' But others considered and rejected the argument that it had been modified; ' still
others applied it vigorously without acknowledging that anything
had happened to cast doubt on it," 5' or restated its dictum broadly
of New Orleans, 219 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. La. 1963), affl'd, 376 U.S. 189 (1964); Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 212 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 377 U.S. 324
(1964); Skrupa v. Sanborn,'210 F. Supp. 200 (D. Kan. 1961), rev'd on the merits sub nom.
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 208
F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Fla. 1962), rev'd on the merits, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Hussey v. Campbell,
189 F. Supp. 54 (S.D. Ga. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Griffin v. Collins, 187 F. Supp.
149 (D. Md. 1960); Braunfeld v. Gibbons, 184 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd sub nom.
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 181 F.
Supp. 37 (E.D. La. 1960), affl'd, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F.
Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1959), affl'd, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Pudlik v. Public Serv. Co., 166 F.
Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1958); Navajo Freight Lines v. Bibb, 159 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Ill. 1958),
affl'd, 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Doud v. Hodge, 146 F. Supp. 887, 890 (N.D. Ill. 1956), aff'd sub
nom. Moray v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.
1956), aff'd mem., 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Russo v. Reed, 93 F. Supp. 554, 558 (D. Me. 1950);
Mo Hock Ke Lok Po v. Stainback, 74 F. Supp. 852 (D. Hawaii 1947), rev'd, 336 U.S. 368
(1948); Goesaert v. Cleary, 74 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Mich. 1947), affl'd, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Toomer v. Witsell, 73 F. Supp. 371, 374 (E.D.S.C. 1947), aff'd in relevant part, 334 U.S. 385
(1948); Allen v. Killoran, 56 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1944); Eubanks v. Tucker, 54 F. Supp.
1001, 1003 (S.D. Tex. 1944).
" Denton v. City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481, 484-87 (5th Cir. 1956); Royal News Co. v.
Schultz, 230 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Mich. 1964), modified on othergrounds, 350 F.2d 302 (6th
Cir. 1965); Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 637 (5th
Cir. 1963); Bailey v. Patterson, 206 F. Supp. 67, 70 (S.D. Miss. 1962), modified on other
grounds, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964); Bush v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182, 185 (E.D. La.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Tugwell v. Bush,
367 U.S. 907 (1961); NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 521 (E.D. Va. 1958), vacated to
permit Pullman abstentionsub nom. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Lee Optical
v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 143-44 n.37 (W.D. Okla. 1954), rev'd on the merits, 348 U.S.
483 (1955); Blass v. Weigel, 85 F. Supp. 775 (D.N.J. 1949). See also Hall v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 72 F. Supp. 533, 535 (D. Hawaii 1947).
"' Alesna v. Rice, 74 F. Supp. 865, 870-71 (D. Hawaii 1947), aff'd, 172 F.2d 176 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 814 (1949); Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 54-55 (D. Kan.),
appeal dismissed by stipulation sub nom. McElroy v. Mitchell, 326 U.S. 690 (1945).
1" Reid v. City of Norfolk, 170 F. Supp. 768, 771-73 (E.D. Va. 1960). See also United
States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 785-87 (5th Cir. 1961) (Cameron, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 850 (1962).
"I Outdoor Am. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 333 F.2d 963 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 903 (1964); Heron v. City of Denver, 317 F.2d 309 (10th Cir. 1963); Fuqua v. United
Steelworkers, 253 F.2d 594, 597-99 (6th Cir. 1958); Alesna v. Rice, 172 F.2d 176, 178 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 814 (1949); United Steelworkers v. Bagwell, 239 F. Supp. 626, 627-28
(W.D.N.C. 1965), rev'd, 383 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1967); Wells v. Hand, 238 F. Supp. 779, 785
(M.D. Ga. 1965), aff'd mem., 382 U.S. 39 (1965); Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.
Miss. 1964), vacated, 381 U.S. 741 (1965); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La.
1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Chase v. McCain, 220 F. Supp. 407, 409 (W.D. Va. 1963),
aff'd sub nom. Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1964) (en banc), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 939 (1965); Zellner v. Lingo, 218 F. Supp. 513, 516 (M.D. Ala. 1963), aff'd mem.,
334 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1964); Grove Press, Inc. v. Calissi, 208 F. Supp. 580, 583 (D.N.J. 1962);
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in situations where it did not apply.'52
Simply counting these cases may underestimate the frequency
with which prospective relief was granted, for the decisions that
ignore Douglas cannot be found in any systematic way. But it is
clear that lower federal courts decided claims for prospective relief
on the merits considerably more often than not"3 and that the Supreme Court routinely entertained such claims whenever they otherwise deserved plenary review. Thus, it is simply not true that the
'4
"doors of the federal equity court" were "long shut by Douglas.""
Some courts were closed, but many others were not. What should
have been important in the long run was that the doors to the
Supreme Court stood open. These are the forgotten precedents;
Arrow Lakes Dairy, Inc. v. Gill, 200 F. Supp. 729, 732 (D. Conn. 1961); Henderson v. Trailway
Bus Co., 194 F. Supp. 423, 427-28 (E.D. Va. 1961) (alternative holding), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Robinson v. Hunter, 374 U.S. 488 (1963); Toth v. Silbert, 184 F. Supp. 163, 167 (N.D. Ohio
1960); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 180 F. Supp. 843,845 (N.D. Ill.
1959) (alternative
holding), aff'd on the merits, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Magtab Publishing Corp. v. Howard, 169
F. Supp. 65, 70 (W.D. La. 1959); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. City of Providence, 166 F.
Supp. 456, 459 (D.R.I. 1958); Dawley v. City of Norfolk, 159 F. Supp. 642, 646 (E.D. Va.),
aff'd, 260 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959); Browder v. City of
Montgomery, 146 F. Supp. 127, 131 (M.D. Ala. 1956); Denton v. City of Carrollton, 132 F.
Supp. 302, 303-04 (N.D. Ga. 1955), rev'd, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956); ILGWU v. Seamprufe,
121 F. Supp. 165, 167, further proceedings, 130 F. Supp. 737, 738-39 (E.D. Okla. 1955);
Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n, 116 F. Supp. 401, 404-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Algonquin Gas
Transmission Co. v. Township of Bernards, 112 F. Supp. 86, 91 (D.N.J. 1953); Atchison, T.
& S.F. Ry. v. Ross, 88 F. Supp. 451, 456 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Bowers v. Calkins, 84 F. Supp.
272, 278-79 (D.N.H. 1949); Priceman v. Dewey, 81 F. Supp. 557,559 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Society
of Good Neighbors v. Groat, 77 F. Supp. 695, 697 (E.D. Mich. 1948); Lammon v. City of San
Francisco, 64 F. Supp. 154, 155 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
152Potter v. Missouri, 325 F.2d 525, 526 (8th Cir. 1963); Wojcik v. Palmer, 318 F.2d 171,
173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930 (1963); Empire Pictures Distrib. Co. v. City of Fort
Worth, 273 F.2d 529, 538-40 (5th Cir. 1960); Ackerman v International Longshoremen's
Union, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d
136, 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947); Bowles v. Hayes, 155 F.2d 351, 353-55
(3d Cir. 1946); New York v. Berger, 239 F. Supp. 219, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Chafee v. Johnson,
229 F. Supp. 445, 447 (S.D. Miss. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 956 (1966); Bailey v. Patterson, 199 F. Supp. 595, 602 (S.D. Miss. 1962), rev'd, 369 U.S.
31 (1963); In re Wyckoff, 196 F. Supp. 515, 519-20 (S.D. Miss. 1961); Jacobs v. Sullivan, 193
F. Supp. 765, 766 (D. Mass. 1961); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Voci v. Farkas, 144 F. Supp. 103, 105-06 (E.D. Pa. 1956); DeVasto v. Hoyt, 101 F. Supp. 908,
910 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Teeval, Inc. v. City of New York, 92 F. Supp. 827, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1949);
Cooper v. Hutchinson, 88 F. Supp. 774, 782 (D.N.J. 1950), rev'd, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950);
East Coast Lumber Terminal, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 81 F. Supp. 701,705 (E.D.N.Y. 1949),
aff'd, 174 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1949); Sellers v. Johnson, 69 F. Supp. 778, 783 (S.D. Iowa 1946),
rev'd, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948); United States v. Renken,
55 F. Supp. 1, 9 (W.D.S.C. 1944), aff'd sub nom. Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147
F.2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
153Compare notes 145-149 supra with notes 150-151 supra.
15 Fiss, supra note 17, at 1163.
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since Dombrowski, they have disappeared from the cases and the
literature.

IIE.
A.

THE DocTRINAL EFFECTS OF

Dombrowski

Short Run Effects-Dombrowski to Steffel

Dombrowski looks quite different against the background of the
forgotten precedents. Prospective relief had been generally available
without regard to the plaintiff's substantive constitutional theory.
After Dombrowski, such relief was available only in exceptional
cases-perhaps only in first amendment overbreadth cases. The
Court resurrected the Douglas dictum, which had not been cited in
a case to which it applied since 1949, adopted it as the framework
for analysis, and said that it had modified the rule of Ex parte
' Young's scores of progeny were ignored
Young. 55
and effectively
buried. Dombrowski made prospective relief presumptively unavailable and shifted the focus of debate from applications of the general
rule of Young to exceptions to the general rule of Douglas.
This was not simply a semantic shift, after which the Young
dilemma continued as a generally recognized exception to the
Douglas dictum. 56 Dombrowski abandoned the common-sense principle that a citizen should not have to risk imprisonment to learn
what his rights are. This principle had given rise to Young, the
Declaratory Judgment Act, Toomer v. Witsell, and the Court's almost unbroken practice from 1908 to 1965. Resurrection of the
Douglas dictum indicated abandonment of the principle;
Dombrowski's explanation of why overbreadth claims were exceptional made it unmistakably clear:
A criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression
usually involves imponderables and contingencies that themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms. When the statutes also have an overbroad sweep, as is
here alleged, the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of
those precious rights may be critical. For in such cases, the
statutes lend themselves too readily to denial of those rights.
The assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will
generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is
unfounded in such cases. For "[t]he threat of sanctions may
deter. . . almost as potently as the actual application of sanc380 U.S. at 483-85; see text at note 21 supra.
Cf. Wechsler, supra note 30, at 784-85 (even when granting prospective relief routinely, Court often claimed to be applying exceptions to contrary general rule).
"

'u
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tions. . . ... Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally
protected expression, we have not required that all of those
subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their
rights. For free expression-of transcendent value to all society,
and not merely to those exercising their rights-might be the
loser. 5 '
This passage, especially in light of the Douglas dictum, strongly
implies that citizens subject to other kinds of regulations are required to risk prosecution to test their rights. Moreover, the Court's
assumption that "defense of a criminal prosecution will generally
assure ample vindication of constitutional rights" '58 cannot be read
as limited to situations in which a plaintiff has already run the risk
of penalties and contemplates no further violations, for the Court
found the criminal remedy inadequate in the overbreadth context
precisely because the risk of penalties chills speech. The implication
is that a criminal defense remains adequate in other contexts despite the risk of penalties. The effect of the Court's ringing endorsement of the Douglas dictum is thus to deny the significance of the
Young dilemma except in overbreadth cases.
This understanding of Dombrowski casts new light on the subsequent litigation in which the Court hammered out the complex
rules that now govern federal prospective relief. Justice Brennan's
opinion in Dombrowski has been viewed as a rallying point for Justices seeking to expand the availability of prospective relief and an
obstacle to those seeking to restrict it.159 Dombrowski has in fact
played exactly the opposite role. In the course of deciding Younger,
Justice Black easily disposed of Dombrowski's overbreadth exception, 8 0 and there is no evidence in subsequent opinions that
Dombrowksi has had any other restraining influence on the Burger
Court. But Dombrowski's resurrection of Douglas and its burial of
the forgotten precedents have continued to haunt supporters of prospective relief, forcing them to make important concessions and to
rely on artificial distinctions to preserve the availability of any prospective relief at all.
These effects of Dombrowski can be seen in two pre-Younger
cases. In each, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court repeated the
Douglas dictum, cited Dombrowski to show that Douglas was still
good law, and kept exceptions narrowly confined. The first,
"1380

U.S. at 486 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

!d.
I58

,' See Fiss, supra note 17.
,' 401 U.S. at 50-51.
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Zwickler v. Koota,'6 ' presented an overbreadth claim. Yet the district court held the claim to be outside the overbreadth exception,
because the plaintiff's rights could be vindicated in a single state
62 This was clearly erroneous not only because it ignored
proceeding.'
the overbreadth exception's emphasis on the rights of other potential speakers,"' but because the plaintiff had already litigated one
state proceeding without resolving his constitutional claim.'64 The
Supreme Court reversed on an arguably narrower ground, remanding for consideration of whether the plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief, and noting that declaratory judgments were not necessarily subject to the same restrictions as injunctions. Thus, looking
forward, Zwickler foreshadows the new importance to be attached
to the distinction between injunctive and declaratory relief.'65 Looking backward, however, Zwickler is a measure of the immediate
impact of Dombrowski: under the forgotten precedents an injunction would have issued routinely.
The second case, Cameron v. Johnson,'6 came before the Court
twice. Cameron p67 resulted in a remand for consideration in light
of Dombrowski and was read as signaling a broad interpretation of
Dombrowski's exceptions.6 8 Cameron III"'produced an opinion that
dashed such hopes. The case presented a compelling claim for prospective relief: the plaintiffs had abandoned a voting-rights picket
line because of arrests under the challenged statute. Prosecutions
were still pending, but the Court attached no significance to that
fact. Instead, it rejected an overbreadth challenge on the merits and
then held that Douglas barred consideration of a claim that the
statute was unconstitutional as applied. Such a claim, it found, fit
neither within the Dombrowski overbreadth exception nor within a
newly enunciated bad-faith-harassment exception. Bad-faith harassment was unaccountably taken from its place in Dombrowski's
discussion of Pullman abstention' 0 and treated as an additional and
"' 389 U.S. 241 (1967).

'8 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 992-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
389 U.S. 241 (1967).
" Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
" 261 F. Supp. at 987.
"3 See text and notes at notes 192-199 infra.
244 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1964), vacated, 381 U.S. 741 (1965), furtherproceedings,
262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1966), affl'd, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
"37 381 U.S. 741 (1965).
"3 See Bailey, supra note 27, at 107-09.
,' 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
,, See text and note at note 14 supra.
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independent exception to the Douglas dictum. The Court construed
the exception so narrowly, however, as to render it almost meaningless, and denied relief because bad-faith harassment had not been
proved.
Since this bad-faith-harassment exception later became the
vehicle for disposing of the overbreadth exception, CameronII initiated the process that would ultimately eliminate Dombrowski's sole
concession to the need for prospective relief. At the same time,
Dombrowski's shift of emphasis from Young to Douglas was clearly
felt. Although the Anti-Injunction Act might have barred injunctions against the pending prosecutions for past violations,' 7' the preDombrowski Court would likely have deemed those prosecutions
irrelevant to the request for injunctions against any further prosecutions 72 Moreover, even if the pre-Dombrowski Court would have
denied relief, it certainly would not have done so for lack of irreparable injury, for the Young dilemma was properly invoked. Cameron
II is thus a direct result of Dombrowski's having denied the significance of the Young dilemma.
Dombrowski and Cameron II paved the way for Younger v.
Harris,7 3 which together with its companion cases 7 4 made prospective relief generally unavailable when a state prosecution is pending.
Writing for the Court in Younger, Justice Black began his analysis
by repeating the Douglas dictum and reviewing the aberrational line
of cases cited in Dombrowski. Without further discussion, he flatly
asserted that "[t]his is where the law stood when the Court decided
Dombrowski.
,,,"11 an assertion that was simply untrue. Since
the general rule in Dombrowski had been announced with respect
to prosecutions that the Court explicitly found were only threatened, 7 application of that rule to cases involving pending prosecutions followed a fortiori. In addition, Justice Black completed the
task of rejecting Dombrowski's only exception. Arguing that the
overbreadth exception was dictum, which it was not, 77 and logically
,"I But see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218 (1947) (enjoining pending administrative enforcement proceeding initiated by private defendants before defendant state commission).
272 See cases cited in note 201 infra.
1 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
11,Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971).
'5 401 U.S. at 47.
' See text and notes at notes 16-18 supra.
,17 See Fiss, supra note 17, at 1112. See also Justice Black's inconsistent view in Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 748-49, 752 (1965) (dissenting) (both overbreadth and harassment required to show irreparabl6 injury under Dombrowski).
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flawed, which it was,1 78 he incorrectly attributed Dombrowski's result to bad-faith harassment, a category Cameron H had already
indicated was empty.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Dombrowski is obviously not responsible for Younger's rejection of the overbreadth exception. And
Justice Black's apparent zeal for banning prospective relief accounts for the harshness of Younger's rhetoric. But Younger's account of the precedents and its rule that prospective relief is generally unavailable were straight out of Dombrowski. At the very least
Justice Black should have had to deal with the contrary precedents
and to confront the Young dilemma before denouncing prospective
relief. By reinstating the Douglas dictum as the general rule and
burying the supervening precedents, Dombrowski permitted him
instead to portray Younger as the logical outgrowth of decades of
precedent.
Younger purported to express no view about requests for prospective relief filed before commencement of any state prosecution, 7' and two Justices emphasized that point in a concurrence. 11
But two aspects of the Younger opinion undermined these disclaimers. First, the Court chose not to argue, as it might have, that the
overbreadth exception was limited to cases in which the Court found
no prosecution pending. Rather, as in CameronII, the Court implicitly assumed that the applicability of Dombrowski's exceptions did
not depend on whether a prosecution was pending. Second, and
more importantly, the Court said that the Douglas line of cases
"made clear" that a suit for prospective relief, "even with respect
to state criminalproceedings not yet formally instituted, could be
8
proper only under very special circumstances."11
The Fifth Circuit took these implications seriously in Becker v.
Thompson, 8 in which the court denied a plaintiff prospective relief
even though he squarely faced the Young dilemma and no prosecution was pending. The majority read Younger as making it "clear
beyond peradventure" that even an unprosecuted plaintiff must be
denied relief unless he could show bad-faith harassment. 8 3 As Judge
Tuttle's concurring opinion indicates, however, Younger's role was
really quite limited. Disagreeing with the majority's reading of that
178401 U.S. at 50-52; see Fiss, supra note 17, at 1111-14.

401 U.S. at 41.
i" Id. at 55 (Stewart, J., joined by Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 45 (opinion of the Court) (emphasis added).
I'2 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
" Id. at 922; see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 27, at 304-05. Contra, WuIp
v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826, 830-32 (1st Cir. 1972).
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case, Judge Tuttle nevertheless concurred in the result on the gound
that Dombrowski itself required dismissal because the plaintiffs had
shown neither overbreadth nor bad-faith harassment.'84 This direct
invocation of Dombrowski is hardly surprising: the majority itself
relied on those parts of Younger resting squarely on the earlier case.
Indeed, Dombrowski was actually the more direct precedent, for like
Dombrowski and unlike Younger, Becker was a case in which no
prosecution was pending. 8 5 Younger's only independent contribution to the result in Becker was abolition of the overbreadth exception, which made it unnecessary for the majority to reject the overbreadth challenge on the merits.
Had the Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Dombrowski and Younger, Ex parte Young would have been
effectively overruled. But the Supreme Court reversed Becker in
Steffel v. Thompson.'8 8 Steffel once again made prospective relief
generally available when no enforcement proceeding is pending.
This result occurred in spite of Dombrowski, however, not because
of it. Indeed, as Judge Tuttle's concurrence below indicated, Steffel
was squarely inconsistent with the rules announced in Dombrowski.
Thus, the defendants relied on Dombrowski for affirmance.s 7 The
plaintiff relied on Dombrowski only to demonstrate that Younger
announced no new law,' and did not even cite Dombrowski in the
section of his brief arguing that he was entitled to a declaratory
judgment. 89 Most importantly, Steffel's rationale was not overbreadth, but the classic Young dilemma, which the Court characterized as the "Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he believed to be constitutionally protected
activity." ' Based on the venerable principle that individuals
should not have to risk prosecution to test their rights, Steffel is the
legitimate descendant of Young, the Declaratory Judgment Act,
and the scores of cases Dombrowski buried. Ultimately, the need for
relief from the Young dilemma is so compelling that when the issue
was squarely presented, as it was in Steffel, the Court found it
necessary to return to traditional practice even without the aid of
the forgotten precedents.
459 F.2d at 924.
See text and notes at notes 16-18 supra.
" 415 U.S. 452 (1974). For decisions foreshadowing Steffel, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 123-24 (1973); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1972).
1s7 Brief for Respondents Hudgens and Reynolds at 5-7, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452 (1974).
"
Brief for Petitioners at 9, 11-25, id.
"' Id. at 26-34.
'" 415 U.S. at 462 (1974), quoted in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710 (1977).
"
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Continuing Effects-The Younger Doctrine

Although Steffel and its progeny have again made prospective
relief routine when no enforcement proceeding is pending,"' the
restoration of past practice is not complete. There are at least three
important differences between the present rules and the preDombrowski practice, each of them to a greater or lesser extent the
result of Dombrowski. The first is that declaratory judgments have
generally been substituted for injunctions.9 2 Dombrowski and the
portion of Younger derived from it have remained as obstacles to
any holding that the Young dilemma satisfies the irreparable injury
requirement. Steffel avoided the issue by granting a declaratory
judgment, emphasizing that equity's irreparable injury requirement does not apply to this statutory remedy and reserving the
question whether injunctions against enforcement would ever be
3
available.1

An adequately enforced declaratory judgment will protect a
citizen in the Young dilemma as effectively as an injunction.'94 Not
surprisingly therefore, nothing has yet turned on the distinction,
and its importance may be fading: the post-Steffel Court has in fact
affirmed one injunction in arguably special circumstances,'95 and
two others without comment in quite ordinary circumstances.'96 But
the Court has not yet squarely rejected Justice Rehnquist's efforts
to reduce declaratory judgments to advisory opinions.'97 Until the
efficacy of declaratory judgments is settled, or the distinction erodes
and injunctions become generally available again, Dombrowski's
resurrection of Douglas will cast doubt on the full availability of
"I See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979); Mackey v. Montrym, 99 S. Ct. 2612
(1979); Babbitt v. UFW, 99 S. Ct. 2301 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 99 S. Ct. 675, 679 n.3
(1979); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Hunt v. Washington State Alple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105
(1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976).
",2
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463 n.12, 466-73 (1974). But see Bellotti v.
Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3052 (1979); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 156-57, 180
(1978); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711-12 (1977); Fiss, supra note 17, at 1144-48;
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HAv. L. Rav. 1133, 1290-91
(1977).
415 U.S. at 463 n.12, 466-73.
" See Laycock, supra note 5, at 216-18.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711-12 (1977).
"' Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3052 (1979); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 156-57, 180 (1978). See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (injunction against
denying marriage license; no explanation why declaratory judgment is insufficient).
", Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 478-84 (1974) (Rhnquist, J., concurring).
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prospective relief even when no enforcement proceeding is pending.
The doubt is not serious, but the Court's official stance is that the
effect of declaratory judgments19 and the availability of injunctions199 are both open issues.
If these issues are ever faced, those members of the Court opposed to making prospective relief generally available will be able
to rely squarely on the Dombrowski- Younger account of the precedents. Dombrowski and Younger say that fear of prosecution does
not justify an injunction except in special circumstances. Logically,
then, fear of prosecution should not justify any relief equivalent to
an injunction. Those committed to making prospective relief available could insist on maintaining the purely formal distinction between injunctions and declaratory judgments, or they could review
all the precedents and acknowledge frankly that the DombrowskiYounger account is historically inaccurate and doctrinally unsound.
Alternatively, the Court may be able to avoid these issues indefinitely, or resolve them by accumulating practice without explanation. But for Dombrowski they would not be open at all.
The second and most important difference between present and
pre-Dombrowski practice is that prospective relief with respect to
contemplated future violations is generally unavailable if an enforcement proceeding is pending with respect to an alleged past
violation."'0 The pre-Dombrowski Court had not squarely faced this
issue, but in practice, pending proceedings had not precluded prospective relief against prosecutions for future violations. 2 ' The AntiInjunction Act was no bar: even before the Supreme Court found
, Id. at 470-71 (opinion of the Court).
" Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
463 n.12 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
Laycock, supra note 5, at 196.
211 See AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 588 (1946) (no distinction drawn between prosecuted and unprosecuted plaintiffs); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 434, 452-53, 466 (1927)
(pending prosecutions not enjoined; future prosecutions against same parties enjoined); Hall
v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 542-44 (1917) (reversing on merits order parallel to that in
Cline); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 563 (1917) (same); Davis &
Farnum Mfg. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 218 (1903) (pending prosecutions
irrelevant) (dictum); cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962) ("Appellants lack
standing to enjoin criminal prosecutions under. . . breach-of-peace statutes, since they have
not been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under them.") (emphasis added); Two
Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 585-89 (1961) (injunction against threatened prosecutions denied on merits despite pending prosecutions under predecessor statute); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (enjoining pending administrative enforcement proceeding initiated by private defendant before defendant state commission); Douglas v. City
of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943) (no distinction drawn between prosecuted and unprosecuted plaintiffs but relief denied to all). But see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 162 (1908)
(dictum).
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that the 1871 Civil Rights Act was an expressly authorized exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act,202 the latter statute did not forbid relief
directed to threatened additional proceedings merely because some
other proceeding was already pending.
Nor does the irreparable injury rule preclude such relief, for as
I have argued extensively elsewhere, 2 3 pending criminal prosecutions often do not offer an adequate remedy. Criminal courts lack
two great powers of equity courts that are essential to eliminating
the Young dilemma: the power to grant prospective relief and the
power to grant interlocutory relief. Thus, the mere pendency of an
enforcement proceeding does not extricate the state defendant from
the Young dilemma if he is contemplating additional violations before a final judgment can be had. 04 Even a judgment in an enforcement proceeding is not always an adequate remedy, for its prospective effect may be unclear.20 5 These serious defects belie the Court's
assumption that defense of a state criminal proceeding is an adequate remedy. But every Justice has indulged in that assumption
and the point has gone by default.
Professor Fiss's speculative but largely convincing analysis of
the post-Dombrowski cases suggests an explanation of how such a
default could have happened. Fiss has suggested that Justice
2
Brennan's opinions in Younger v. Harris and Perez v. Ledesma, 6
conceding that prospective relief should be generally unavailable
once a prosecution was commenced, were part of a deeply laid strategy to save declaratory judgments where no prosecution was pending. This strategy successfully culminated in Steffel.20 7 But it is now
clear that Justice Brennan was struggling to regain part of what he
had given away in Dombrowski, and that without Dombrowski the
key concession would have been unnecessary. Since the general argument for prospective relief would have been solidly based on the
forgotten precedents, leaving prospective relief in the preenforcement situation relatively secure, Justice Brennan and his
allies would have been free to dispute the significance of pending
prosecutions. Had they taken this opportunity, some of the remedial
"I Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
20 Laycock, supra note 5, at 196-222.

"I Id. at 202-14.
2" Id. at 214-22. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 241 (1967) (state defendant litigated criminal trial and two
appeals without resolving constitutional question because he was acquitted on facts of particular case).
2- 401 U.S. 82, 93-136 (dissenting in part).
2" Fiss, supra note 17, at 1121-29.
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inadequacies of the criminal defense might have become important
exceptions to the Younger doctrine. But even this formulation reverses the true relationship of the competing principles. If the Court
had followed the pre-Dombrowski precedents authorizing injunctions against future enforcement despite the pendency of an earlier
prosecution, Younger's refusal to enjoin the pending prosecution
would have been merely an exception to the general practice of
granting prospective relief.
The third difference between present and pre-Dombrowski
practice is that the defendant state officials can now abort a federal
suit for prospective relief by filing a retaliatory state enforcement
proceeding." 8 This "reverse removal power" sometimes gives the
choice of forum to state officials, even though Congress plainly intended to give that choice to the citizen alleging violation of his
federal rights. 9 The citizen can now be certain of a federal forum
only if he abstains from exercising his claimed federal rights until
"proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in federal
court. 2 10 Thus, the Young dilemma is aggravated by adding the risk
of adjudication in a state forum2 1' to the risk of penalties.
The reverse removal power derives from the prohibition on relief when an enforcement proceeding is pending. If pending state
proceedings did not bar prospective relief, retaliatory proceedings
would be irrelevant and the reverse removal power impossible. At
most the Court would decline to enjoin the retaliatory proceeding.
If contemplated future violations still presented the plaintiff with
the Young dilemma, the Court would not assume that the retaliatory proceeding provided an adequate remedy and would not dismiss the federal case. Thus, to the extent Dombrowski led to the
present emphasis on pending prosecutions, it also led to the reverse
removal power.
In addition, the false image of Younger's precedential base,
resulting from Dombrowski, may have independently contributed to
the reverse removal power. The case creating that power was decided by a majority of five who thought any other rule would
"trivialize" Younger;212 the dissenters charged the Court with tri21 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
349-50 (1975) (alternative holding).
20 Fiss, supra note 17, at 1134-36.
210 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (alternative holding). See also Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975) ("no contested matter had been decided").
"I See Laycock, supra note 5, at 232-34.
212 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350 (1975) (alternative holding).
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vializing Steffel.213 A distorted view of the comparative strength of
these two precedents may have affected at least one Justice's vote
on how to draw the line between them.
Dombrowski's lingering effects may not be limited to these
three principal areas. For example, the Burger Court has dramatically restricted the availability of injunctions against unconstitutional administration of state programs that do not require judicial
enforcement, 21' at least when criminal justice agencies are involved.2 15 These restrictions have drawn heavily on the rhetoric of
"Our Federalism" in Younger, 21 and that rhetoric would have been
far less sweeping had Dombrowski not obliterated the inconsistent
precedents. But Dombrowski's contribution to such collateral developments is far less direct than its impact on the availability of
prospective relief in the face of the Young dilemma.
Of course it is possible that all of these developments were
political rather than legal events. The Court may have been so
determined to restrict federal judicial power that no combination of

precedents would have stopped

it.217

But this possibility merely sug-

gests that if Dombrowski had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent it: the Younger doctrine could not have developed as
it did without elimination of the forgotten precedents. Dombrowski
accomplished that task with remarkable thoroughness; it was the
beginning of the Younger era.
IV.

SPECULATIONS ON THE CAUSES OF

Dombrowski

The leading explanation for Dombrowksi's treatment of the
irreparable injury requirement has been supplied by Professor Fiss.
Fiss has suggested that Justice Brennan was committed to prospective relief and did not believe in the Douglas dictum, but that he
acknowledged it in order to hold a majority for his result.218 In this
view Justice Brennan hoped to erode Douglasfrom within, perhaps
by creating more exceptions, or perhaps by generalizing upon his
recognition that, in the overbreadth context, the risk of penalties
could deter constitutionally protected conduct. This explanation
would be persuasive if the Douglas dictum had been good law in
Id. at 353 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See text and notes at notes 92-94 supra.
215 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). See
generally Fiss, supra note 17, at 1148-60.
21 423 U.S. at 379-80; 414 U.S. at 499-502.
227But see Soifer & MacGill, supra note 47, at 1167 (suggesting that Justice Black could
not admit that Younger was a policy decision).
"I Fiss, supra note 17, at 1107-08, 1160-64.
213
2I
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1965. But since the Court had worked out from under Douglas years
before and since it would have made no sense for Justice Brennan
to resurrect deliberately a rule he hoped to destroy, this explanation
is no longer sufficient.
There are three possible theories consistent with the existence
of the forgotten precedents. One theory is that the Court-or certain
key Justices-determined as a matter of policy to limit the availability of prospective relief, even at the cost of distorting precedent.
A second is that the Court overlooked the forgotten precedents and
mistakenly thought Douglas to be good law. Finally, a third possibility-a variation of the second-is that the Court knew about the
forgotten precedents but mistakenly thought them distinguishable
for some reason that was never stated and that has now been forgotten.
The opinion itself is consistent with either of the first two theories. It reads as though the Court were unaware of any case after
Douglas, but the Court could have deliberately created that impression. Citation of favorable but obsolete precedent is an obvious technique for changing existing law while giving lip service to precedent." 9 This technique might have been especially appealing in
Dombrowski, since the intervening precedents were not very visible220 and the judgment for the plaintiffs tended to distract attention
from the doctrinal shift in favor of defendants.
Yet the policy theory must explain why a Court that had been
routinely granting prospective relief suddenly changed direction.
The facts of the case did not compel such a shift. If the Court had
merely been troubled by something about the specific facts of
Dombrowski, such as the arguable pendency of the state prosecu'
tions,2 21
it could have created a narrow rule for such cases without
resurrecting the Douglas dictum in general terms. Nor was
Dombrowski foreshadowed; the Court's immediate pre-Dombrowski
opinions do not suggest increasing reluctance to grant prospective
relief. To the contrary, prospective relief had been granted with
22
increasing frequency in the early sixties.
Conceivably, this expanded use of prospective relief triggered
-a reaction. It has been suggested 223 that the federalism decisions of
211 See

Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 19

J.L. & ECON. 249, 274 (1976).

See text and notes at notes 250-255 infra.
See text and notes at notes 16-18 supra.
2 See cases cited in notes 98-101 supra.
See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,420-21 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust:Reflections on
22
2'
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the early forties24 were a reaction to economic substantive due process, a doctrine later regarded 2 5as an abuse of judicial power. There
could plausibly have been a similar reaction in the sixties when the
civil rights movement and the Court's increasing activism focused
attention on federalism issues in a way that occasional injunctions
against isolated statutes had not.26
It is easy to imagine some Justices consciously desiring to abandon the then existing practice. But this explanation is ultimately
insufficient to save the policy theory because it is simply impossible
to identify any essential members of the Dombrowski majority who
might have insisted on resurrection of Douglas and silent burial of
the forgotten precedents as the price of their votes. Justice White is
a possibility, 2 7 but his vote was not essential. Since only seven
Justices participated in the decision, Justice Brennan could have
written for a majority of four. Justice White's vote would be desired,
but not at the cost of knowingly resurrecting Douglas and distorting
the precedents. Even if Justice Brennan feared that the two Justices
not participating in Dombrowski would later join Justice White and
the two dissenters to make a majority for overruling the case, he
would have been on stronger ground defending Dombrowski as a
four-Justice opinion solidly based on decades of precedent than ask
a five-Justice opinion purporting to carve an innovative exception
to Douglas.
The essential votes, therefore, were those of Justices Brennan,
Warren, Douglas and Goldberg. None of these Justices can reasonably be thought to have knowingly demanded a return to Douglas.
s
All of them joined the five-man majority in Cameron1,22 which the
Court summarily remanded for reconsideration despite vigorous dissents arguing that prospective relief should be denied and that the
remand implied a dangerously broad construction of Dombrowski.
Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. Rsv. 328, 331-34 (1975); Wechsler, supra note 30, at 799-813,
827-33.
22 Most notably, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32 (1963); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423-24 (1952); E. CORWIN, Couir OVER CONSTTUTION (1938); G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsTrrunoNAL LAW 564-65 (9th ed. 1975).
M See B. MARSHALL, supra note 132.
22' See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (opinion for the Court); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717-19 (1977) (dissenting); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)
(opinion for the Court); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 821-60 (1974) (joining Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (opinion for the Court); Cameron v.
Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 754-59 (1965) (dissenting).
, 381 U.S. 741 (1965).
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Justice White wrote one of these dissents. If anyone had joined
Justice White in a bargaining bloc that forced the resurrection of
Douglas, it is unlikely that he would have abandoned the bloc six
weeks later when it had the chance to keep Dombrowski's exceptions narrowly confined. 29
There is further evidence concerning Justices Brennan, Warren,
and Douglas in their dissenting votes a year later in City of Greenwood v. Peacock;230In Peacock, they would have allowed state prosecutions to be removed to federal court on allegations that the prosecutions were racially motivated and that the state court would not
provide fair trials. Sanctioning removal of a pending prosecution is
a greater interference with state proceedings than enjoining a
threatened one,2' and finding as a fact that a judge or jury will be
unfair is a greater affront to state courts than invalidating a state
law.232 Like Dombrowski, the Peacock dissent was squarely inconsistent with precedent,23 but unlike Dombrowski, the reversal of
precedent would have expanded federal power. It is possible that the
same justices deliberately moved so aggressively in such opposite
directions on issues they recognized as "close kin,"' ' 4 but that possibility seems implausible even allowing for the turbulence of the
intervening year. Although Justice Goldberg did not participate in
Peacock-he had resigned from the Court-there is other evidence
for him: his postresignation references to Dombrowski portray it as
a desirable expansion of federal remedies.23
Justice Brennan's subsequent opinions in Cameron 11,2
Younger v. Harris,27 and Samuels v. Mackell,28 the first of which
was joined by Chief Justice Warren just before he-retired, give rise
to a barely colorable argument that Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren were hostile to propective relief and hence could have
known what they were doing in Dombrowski. But the contrary evi2" On the importance of the remand in CameronI, see Bailey, supra note 27, at 107-09.
384 U.S. 808 (1966).
2' See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808, 846 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Laycock, supra note 5, at 226, 228-29, 235-37.
212Fiss, supra note 17, at 1116-17.
2 As to Peacock, see 384 U.S. at 848-52 (Douglas, J., dissentiig).
21 384 U.S. at 846 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., Brennan & Fortas,
J.J.).
- ' A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE: THF WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT 24-25 (1971);
Goldberg, Mr. Justice Brennan and the First Amendment, 4 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 8, 43 n.216
(1972).
390 U.S. 611 (1968).
401 U.S. 37, 56-58 (1971) (concurring).
401 U.S. 66, 75-76 (1971) (concurring).
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dence is overwhelming. In addition to their votes in Peacock and
Cameron I, there are all of Justice Brennan's votes and opinions
supporting prospective relief in cases in which, like Dombrowski, no
enforcement proceeding was pending.29 Especially in light of Professor Fiss's analysis of Justice Brennan's strategy,4 0 the Cameron II,
Younger, and Samuels opinions are more plausibly viewed as products of a single mistake originating in Dombrowski than as evidence
that Dombrowski was deliberate.
Finally, the policy theory cannot account for Dombrowski's
widespread reception as a victory for the civil rights movement.
Justice Douglas certainly was not hostile to federal prospective relief,21 and he refused to accept compromises on the issue. He dissented in Cameron I and wrote separately in most of the important
Younger cases before his retirement. His failure to write separately
in Dombrowski is strong evidence that he was not aware of any
scheme for deliberate retrenchment. The reaction of the practicing
and academic bar is more probative yet. Even if there were a conspiracy on the Court to conceal the forgotten precedents, there
would have been no such conspiracy among the civil rights bar, and
the Court could not have abandoned those precedents without protest. The policy theory must therefore be rejected.
The oversight theory is only slightly less implausible. It is difficult to believe that the Dombrowski majority simply forgot the procedural route by which so many constitutional cases had come to
the Court. Prospective relief had been ordered four times the pre-

"'

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (joining majority); Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 353-57 (1975) (joining Stewart, J., dissenting); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452 (1974) (opinion of the Court); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972)
(opinion of the Court); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93-136 (1971) (dissenting in part); cf.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 450-60 (1977) (dissenting) (civil enforcement proceeding
pending); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (joining majority) (prosecution no longer
pending because not appealed); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 341-48 (1977) (dissenting) (civil
enforcement proceeding pending); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611-18 (1975)
(dissenting) (civil enforcement proceeding no longer pending because not appealed).
240See text at notes 206-207 supra.
24!See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 934 (1975) (dissenting in part); Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 353-57 (1975) (joining Stewart, J., dissenting); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 618 (1975) (dissenting); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974) (opinion
for the Court); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 505-13 (1974) (dissenting); Dyson v. Stein,
401 U.S. 200, 204-15 (1971) (dissenting); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,90-93 (1971) (dissenting in part); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 74.75 (1971) (concurring); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 58-65 (1971) (dissenting); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 622-28 (1968)
(joining Fortas, J., dissenting); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411, 423-37 (1964) (concurring); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458, 462 n.3 (1961) (dissenting); Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 306 (1943) (opinion
for the Court).
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vious term and eleven times in the previous four years.24 2 Some of
the opinions granting prospective relief had discussed the
irreparable injury issue,4 3 and many of the recent cases had discussed other procedural issues raised by requests for prospective
relief, such as Pullman abstention, 244 standing, 24 5 construction of the
Three-Judge Court Act, 248 imminence of prosecution, 24 7 and justiciability. 25 That the majority in Dombrowski-and apparently most of
the profession-believed the Douglas dictum to have been the last
word on irreparable injury seems incredible.
Yet there were factors at work to make such an oversight possible. The most important was the plaintiffs' failure to brief the forgotten precedents. They acknowledged the authority of Douglas and
sought to distinguish it, offering the core of what Justice Brennan
developed into the overbreadth exception. 249 They did not argue,
even in the alternative, that Douglas was wrong or had been seriously eroded by subsequent Supreme Court authority. Although two
of the Supreme Court's post-Douglas prospective relief cases were
briefly described in footnotes, 259 plaintiffs relied primarily on lower
court decisions. It is possible that the plaintiffs made a strategic
choice to urge only the narrowest ground for reversal, but it appears
that they were unaware of the most important post-Douglas developments.
It would not have been impossible for the plaintiffs' counsel and
the Supreme Court law clerks to overlook the forgotten precedents,
for they had never been very visible: most of the cases that eroded
Douglas did not cite it, it had never been squarely disapproved, its
dictum had occasionally been quoted with approval, and Shepard's
242 See notes 98, 100 supra.

243See text at notes 73-91, 104-123 supra.
244Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 328-29 (1964); England
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353-54 (1962); Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 589 (1961);
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357
U.S. 77, 84 (1958); see D. CURRiE, supra note 34, at 746.
245Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962); City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1958).
21 Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962); Turner v. City of
Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353 (1962); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362
U.S. 73, 75-85 (1960); see D. CuRRiE, supra note 34, at 746.
21 Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1961).
2" Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1961); Evers v. Dwyer, 358
U.S. 202, 203-04 (1958).
Brief for Appellants and Appellants-Intervenors at 82-89, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965).
21 Id. at 87-88 nn. 52 & 53.
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Citations gave little hint of what had happened. 5' Many of the cases
were not digested, and those that were appeared under different key
numbers than Douglas.252 The leading casebook set forth the
Douglas dictum as good law.? 3 Even the Assistant Attorney General
for the Civil Rights Division apparently did not know about the
forgotten precedents.?"
Obviously the forgotten precedents could have been found; indeed, the Court appears to have known about at least one of them.2 5
But superficial research was not sufficient to find the others. Patience and indirect research methods were required, and it would
have helped to have been confident the cases would turn up if one
just kept looking. If everyone started out with the impression that
Douglas was the law, Dombrowski could have been briefed and
decided without discovery of the error.
The oversight theory also largely accounts for the bar's reaction
to Dombrowski. The factors that caused the Court to overlook the
forgotten precedents would also have affected the rest of the profession. One must wonder why none of the many lawyers who had filed
the suits that resulted in the forgotten precedents did not expose
Dombrowski's error, but there are possible explanations even for
that. As the briefs in Dombrowski and other cases indicate, some
lawyers filed such suits without knowing about enough of the forgotten precedents to recognize the pattern and argue that Douglas was
dead. Of those who knew, some may have remained silent because
they found Dombrowski acceptable on balance. By granting prospective relief even though a prosecution was arguably pending,
Dombrowski seemed to give plaintiffs extra time to get to the courthouse.2 5 6 One commentator plausibly viewed the remand in
7
Cameron I as promising expansion of Dombrowski's exceptions.2
Another thought it sufficient that Dombrowski had secured prospective relief in first amendment cases.2 1 Of the lawyers who did know
2"1 See United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 786 (5th Cir. 1961)(Cameron, J., dissenting)
("Shepard's Citations show that the case has been cited one hundred forty times and, until
the majority opinion here, its binding force had been questioned only [once].")
25 Compare 13 MODERN FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST Courts § 262.4(5) (1960) with 15 id. §
508(7) and 27A id. Injunctions § 105(1) (1969).
2 H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 862 (1st ed.
1953); see Wechsler, supranote 30, at 822 n.333 (attaching great importance to this mistake).
2

See B. MARSHALL, supra note 132, at 53-54.

See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 19 (1965) (citing Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958));
text at notes 111-115 supra.
2

"

See text at notes 16-18 supra.

21
2-

Bailey, supra note 27, at 107-09.
Wechsler, supra note 30, at 843-45.
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about the forgotten precedents, some must have been full-time
practitioners with no interest in publishing. Finally, once
Dombrowski was written and the initial wave of commentary failed
to expose the oversight, the forgotten precedents were buried more
deeply than ever.
A variation on the oversight theory is that the Court was aware
of the forgotten precedents but thought them distinguishable from
Douglas and Dombrowski. Perhaps in the mental maps of the Vinson and Warren Courts there was a Douglas-Dombrowski line of
cases and a Toomer-Young line of cases, with a distinction between
them so obvious to lawyers of the time that it was never stated, with
the result that it has now been lost. Such a supposition might explain Justice Douglas's remarkable concurrence in England v.
LouisianaState Board of MedicalExaminers,259 in which, in a single
opinion, he denounced the Pullman abstention doctrine as a serious
interference with the right to bring constitutional challenges to state
2°
statutes in federal court and repeated the Douglas dictum.
But there are fatal problems with the lost-distinction theory.
There is a total lack of evidence that such a distinction ever existed
and considerable evidence that it did not. Dombrowski itself tends
to negate this theory, for it did not distinguish Douglas from Young
but rather treated Douglas as having modified Young. There is no
mention of such a distinction in any of the numerous postDombrowski analyses of prospective relief. There is also no way to
explain how a distinction so obvious and well understood as never
to require any mention could be so thoroughly forgotten so quickly.
Nor is there any way to explain why not one case from the DouglasDombrowski line reached the Supreme Court in the sixteen years
between Stainback and Dombrowski. Such cases were common in
the Supreme Court in the early forties and again after Dombrowski,
and were common in the lower courts throughout the period when
only Toomer-Young cases reached the Supreme Court;' moreover,
2 12
they were often within the Court's mandatory jurisdiction.
More importantly, there are places where such a distinction
would have to be mentioned if it existed. In particular, it would
inevitably have been noted in the opinions of lower courts puzzled
by Douglas and in the Supreme Court briefs arguing over the applicability of Douglas. These sources reflect attempts to make sense of
' 375 U.S. 411, 423-37 (1964).
'

Id. at 423.

28 See cases cited in notes 150-151 supra.
282

28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976). -
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the conflicting cases and properly categorize a particular case in
some existing framework; if there were some well-known distinction
that explained everything, it-would be mentioned here. It is not.
Indeed, defendants and some lower courts concluded that there was
no distinction, that Douglas controlled. 2 3 Some plaintiffs simply
264
cited cases such as Toomer and made no effort to explain Douglas.
Some judges and litigants offered subtle distinctions to explain the
cases, but their suggestions are so wildly inconsistent as to belie the
2 65
existence of any well-known, settled distinction.
There are only three arguments that may represent attempts to
divide all the cases into two clean categories; none comes close to
fitting the cases. The suggestion that prospective relief issued only
in civil rights or civil liberties cases 266 is the most clearly erroneous,
for the leading cases in each supposed line are all in the wrong
categories: Douglas and Dombrowski were civil liberties cases and
20 See United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 786-87 (5th Cir. 1961) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Motion to Affirm at 7, Brief for Appellees at 17-20, Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956);
Brief for Appellee, J. Tom Watson at 13-17, AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
141Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement at 4-5, Appellants' Brief at 52, Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960); Brief for Appellees at 22-23, Morey
v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
2" Brief for Appellants at 7-12, Paul v. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S.
132 (1963) (distinction depends on extent of harm shown by plaintiff); Jurisdictional Statement at 27, Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (state remedy adequate in Douglas but
inadequate in Bailey); Appellee's Motion to Affirm at 7, Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S.
11 (1961) (state prosecution in Gremillion brought with purpose and effect of frustrating
earlier federal court order); Brief for Appellants at 40, Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt.,
Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (exception to Douglasfor cases involving exceptional circumstances,
substantial constitutional claim, and great and immediate danger of irreparable loss of property rights); Appellee's Brief at 25, id. (cases denying prospective relief "usually contain
elements of anticipating state construction, or of interference in criminal prosecutions already
in progrpess, or of little or no damage to the parties in awaiting state action", prospective relief
will issue "where substantial property damage is inflicfed by enforcement. . . where multiple prosecutions . . . are threatened [or] where basic civil or constitutional rights are involved"); Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 12-13, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960) (cases in which plaintiffs could not conduct business without
violating statute distinguished from cases in which plaintiffs could operate in compliance;
race cases distinguished on ground that racial identity is unchangeable); Appellee's Brief at
29-34, id. (distinction depends on extent of harm to plaintiffs); Jurisdictional Statement at
15, Brief for Appellants at 27-28, Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (exceptions to Douglas
for statutes with severe penalties and plaintiffs whose "successful business . . . suddenly
finds its very existence threatened by exceptional circumstances of a very serious nature");
Brief Opposing Motion to Affirm at 8-9, Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956) (Douddismissed
below for lack of jurisdiction but Douglas upheld jurisdiction; statutes with and without
severable sections distinguished); Appellant's Brief at 31-37, AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582
(1946) (injury in AFL great and immediate, but not in Douglas).
2,' See cases cited in notes 145 & 149 supra; Jurisdictional Statement at 27-28, Bailey v.
Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962); Motion to Affirm at 7-8, Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S.
11 (1961); Maraist, supra note 30, at 548-52.
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Young and Toomer were economic regulation cases.2 17 The opposite
theory-that prospective relief issued only to protect property
rights-has also been suggested,26 but scores of civil rights cases are
28 9
available to refute it.
The remaining suggestion is that the Court would enjoin enforcement of a state policy although it would not enjoin a criminal
prosecution. 270 But the distinction would make no sense whenever
it was applied to policies backed by criminal penalties, for an injunction against enforcement of the policy would be an injunction
against' prosecutions to enforce it. One way to make sense of this
suggestion, although not the way its proponents intended, is to view
the Court as having authorized prospective relief only when no particular prosecution was threatened. But this understanding states
the Court's approach exactly backwards; prospective relief would
not issue unless there were a threat.2 7 The defendants in Steffel v.
ThompsonZ72 tried to avoid that difficulty by urging three categories
upon the Court: cases with an "imminent threat of state prosecution," cases without a threat of prosecution but with a "direct threat
of personal detriment," and cases with "only a speculative future
application of the state law. '273 They would have allowed prospective relief only in the second category, but the Court rejected the
proffered distinction. Moreover, the imminence or explicitness of
the threat of prosecution explains the cases no better than the civil
rights distinction.2 74 A review of all the cases suggests no other possible distinction; they simply cannot be categorized in a way that
accounts for the different approaches to prospective relief. The lostdistinction theory must also be rejected.
Any explanation of Dombrowski's break with precedent is of
course speculative. The most likely explanation, however, as sur267See also text and notes at notes 97-101 supra.
"I Jurisdictional Statement on Behalf of Appellants at 9, Gremillion v. United States,
368 U.S. 11 (1961); Brief for Appellants at 11-12, Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956).
"I See, for example, cases cited in notes 98 & 99 supra.
21 Motion to Affirm at 3-4, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
21 E.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. at 484 n.2, 496 n.13; see text and note at note
15 supra.
2 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
273Brief for Respondents Hudgens and Reynolds at 7-8, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452 (1974).
v Compare AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946) (vigorous state enforcement effort with
explicit threats and some proceedings already pending; prospective relief authorized) with
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (same; prospective relief denied). Compare
Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (enforcement proceeding filed immediately after federal
suit; prospective relief granted) with Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (same;
prospective relief authorized but only as part of a narrow exception to Douglas).
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prising as it seems, is that a simultaneous breakdown of the briefing
system, the legal research tools, and the Justices' own memories
caused the Court to adopt by mistake a rule that was supported
neither by precedent nor by the policy preferences of the majority.

V.

THE DUTY OF CORRECTION

Anglo-American law relies heavily on judicial decisions to formulate and transmit legal rules. 25 This system has been repeatedly
criticized for obscuring the law in a great mass of relatively unorganized printed matter and making it impossible to learn the law on
any particular point without extensive research. 26 Dombrowski
lends new force to such criticisms. The disappearance without comment of a large body of decisions and the reversal of a legal rule
without public recognition of the change could only have resulted
from a systemic malfunction. It is unlikely that major oversights
occur with enough frequency to raise serious concern about the reliability of judicial opinions as a repository for legal doctrine,277 but
that possibility poses an intriguing empirical question. It in turn
raises the broader issue of the relative frequency of inadvertant
doctrinal discontinuities in common-law and civil-law systems, an
issue that should be of interest to scholars investigating the comparative advantages of emphasizing precedent or code in the operation
of law.
Dombrowski also raises the quite practical question of how a
court should respond when it discovers that one of its precedents is
based on an oversight. Significantly, in other, less dramatic instances in which the Supreme Court has discovered that an oversight
contributed to an erroneous precedent, it has corrected its mistake.
In Trustees of the PhiladelphiaBaptist Association v. Hart's
Executors,28 the Court held that there could be no charitable trust
without statutory authorization, because charitable trusts in England had depended on a statute enacted in 1601.211 In Vidal v. Gir7 See Landes & Posner, supra note 219, at 249-50, 271-75.
211 J. KENT,COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *473-75; R. POLLARD, SPEED-UP LAW REFORM
6-7 (1958); Lloyd, Codifying English Law, 2 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 155 (1949); Stone, A Primer
on Codification, 29 TUL. L. REv. 303, 304 (1955); Van Hecke, A Civilian Looks at the
Common-Law Lawyer in PARKER SCHOOL STUDIES IN FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, 30TH
ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM: INTERNATONAL CONTRACTS 5, 6-7 (W. Reese ed. 1962).
2n See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960). But see J. KENT, supra note

276, at * 473-75; K. LLEWELLYN, supra, at 85, 133-35, 256-60, 305, 450-60; Lobingier, Precedent
in Past and Present Legal Systems, 44 MICH. L. REv. 955, 984-86 (1946).
27 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819).
21 43 Eliz., c.4 (1601).
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ard's Executors, 2 0 the Court reached the opposite result, citing
"very strong additional light. . . thrown upon this subject" by the
subsequent publication of historical records showing that charitable
trusts were enforced before 1601 and hence without the aid of statute.28 ' In United States v. Murdock, 82 the Court cited King of the
Two Sicilies v. Willcox2 8 for what it thought was the English rule
that the privilege against self-incrimination did not protect against
incrimination under the laws of another sovereign. The Court was
unaware that Sicilies had been disapproved shortly after it was
decided,284 and discovery of this error played an important role in
the Warren Court's opinion overruling Murdock.115 Similarly, the
decision in Swift v. Tyson 5 ' that state common law does not control
in federal diversity cases was surely affected by the Court's ignorance of the original draft of the Rules of Decision Act.2 87 Professor
Warren's subsequent discovery of the draft2 88 contributed to the
overruling of Swift in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.28
2
Most recently, in Monroe v. Pape,
1 the Court concluded that
the Civil Rights Act of 187191 created no cause of action against
municipalities. This conclusion was based on a fallacious inference
from one bit of legislative history-rejection of the Sherman
Amendment-and apparent unawareness of a much larger body of
legislative history pointing to an opposite conclusion.2 9 2 Monroe resembles Dombrowski in that the issue had not been briefed. 93 There
was even a line of inconsistent cases, somewhat analagous to the
forgotten precedents, mainly involving suits against school
boards.294 Apparently the Court thought school boards distinguishable from municipalities. But the distinction collapsed on analysis
because both school boards and municipalities were separately in21 43
2'
-2

U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).

Id. at 196.

284 U.S. 141 (1931).

61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851).
United States v. McRae, 3 Ch.App. 79 (1867).
21 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 60-63, 67, 71-72 (1964).
2' 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV.L.
Rav. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1924).
29 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 n.5 (1938).
,0365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
291 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
212 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665-89 (1978).
2,3Id. at 708-09 (Powell, J., concurring).
21' Id. at 663 (opinion of the Court, collecting cases).
21
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corporated units of local government.9 5 Recognition of the relevance
of this second line of cases and discovery of the additional legislative
history contributed to the overruling of Monroe in Monell v. Department of Social Services.29 These overrulings are in accord with the
prevailing view in the American literature. 27 Even in England there
is a willingness to correct precedents based on significant over29 8
sights.
But Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Monell challenges this consensus.2 9 His position appears to be that citizens
must be able to rely on any precedent, even one with "obvious
flaws" or one based on grounds that were "'never actually briefed
and argued.' "0 He sees this as a "necessary by-product of the
adversary system," which relies "upon litigants to present 'all the
relevant considerations,' "301 and concludes that any other rule
"would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the law.131 2 Justice
Rehnquist does not argue that precedent can never be overruled, but
he does say that overrulings require an extraordinary showing and
that it is irrelevant whether the erroneous earlier decision was the
result of an oversight.
Justice Rehnquist's position is seriously flawed. The Court's
well-developed criteria for prospective overruling are sufficient to
accommodate any genuine reliance interests.3 3 In his apparent
2's Id. at 695-99; id. at 710-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
"I Id. at 663 (opinion of the Court).
21 See A. GOLDBERG, supra note 235, at 79-81; J. KENT, supra note 276, at *475-78; K.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 277, at 291-94; Lobingier, supra note 277, at 973-74; Noland, Stare
Decisis and the Overruling of ConstitutionalDecisions in the Warren Years, 4 VAL. L. Ray.
101, 110 (1969). See also Rivota v. Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1225, 1229 (7th
Cir. 1974).
" See Morrelle Ltd. v. Wakeling, [1955] 2 Q.B. 379, 398-407 (C.A.); Young v. Bristol
Aeroplane Co., [1944] K.B. 718, 728-30 (C.A.); R. CROSS, PRECEDFNT IN ENGLISH LAW 13436, 143-44 (3d ed. 1977). See also Practice Statement of the House of Lords, reprinted in id.
at 109; London St. Tramways Co. v. London County Council, [1898] A.C. 375 (H.L.).
21 436 U.S. at 717-18. But see Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 99 S. Ct. 1905,
1929-30 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, J.) (relying on Monell's treatment of oversight); City of Columbus v. Leonard, 99 S.Ct. 3097, 3101 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari to review 551 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1977)) ("The Court having reopened [part] . . .of Monroe v. Pape, I would . . . reconsider" Monroe's rule that
exhaustion of state remedies is not required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). That rule "was
reached in an almost off-the-cuff manner.").
436 U.S. at 718 (internal quotation from 436 U.S. at 708 (Powell, J. concurring)).
282 Id. (internal quotation from 436 U.S. at 709 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring)); see Landes
& Posner, supra note 219, at 272.
3" 436 U.S. at 718.
30 See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-09 (1971); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422
(1964); Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 363-66 (1932); Gelpcke v.
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quest for certainty for its own sake, Justice Rehnquist goes far beyond insisting that the Court refrain from second guessing its earlier
judgments on matters of policy or interpretation. He would commit
the Court to perpetuating its least defensible blunders-cases in
which the Court erred because it failed even to consider the most
telling authority or argument for the losing side, or in which its
conclusion was not subjected to the discipline of writing an opin3 5
ion 314 that would be open to criticism by the profession. 1
The necessities of the adversary system may require that when
an attorney fails to call the Court's attention to a key point, the
litigant who hired him must suffer the resulting injustice. This principle is part of the law of res judicata. 3 1 But nothing requires that
an innocent population live indefinitely under an erroneous rule of
law just because the first lawyer to take the issue before the Court
made an inadequate argument. Nothing was decided concerning
arguments he did not make. To make precedents binding with respect to all arguments that could have been made is to convert stare
decisis into a form of res judicata without the safeguard of limitation
to parties and their privies. Even statutes are not so binding, for any
citizen may petition for amendment or repeal at any time.
Justice Rehnquist's proposed rule would also have other undesirable consequences. It would aggravate the existing pressure on
attorneys with novel arguments to get a case to the Court before
someone else makes bad law.1 7 Second, because a Court unable to
City of Dubuque, 68-U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863); K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 277, at 299-305;
Leflar, Sources of Judge-Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 319, 333-35 (1971). See also Harlin v.
Missouri, 99 S. Ct. 709, 710 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., for the Court);
K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 277, at 26-28, 287-91; Leflar, supra note 303, at 319; Smith, A
Primer of Opinion Writing, For Four New Judges, 21 ARK. L. REV. 197, 201 (1967).
"I On the importance to judicial law-making of scholarly criticism, see K. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 277, at 29-31, 345-55, 460-61 (1960); Kurland, Preface, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. vii; id.
at ii (quoting Chief Justice Harlan Stone and Judge Learned Hand); Leflar, supra note 303,

at 319, 323, 336; Rheinstein, Common Law and Civil Law, 22 RVSTA

JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSI-

PUERTo Rico 90, 102 (1952); Smith, supra note 304 at 200-01; Swygert, Introduction,
50 CHI.-KErT L. Rav. 181, 181 (1973). See also City of Columbus v. Leonard, 99 S.Ct. 3097,
3101 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari to review 551 F.2d 974 (5th
Cir. 1977)) (relying on scholarly criticism of case he wished to overrule); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 284, 289-90 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
31 Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudel, 414 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1974) (quoting Commissioner
v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) and Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 351,
352 (1877)); United States v. Temple, 299 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1962); Matthews v. Wolvin, 266
F.2d 722, 726 (5th Cir. 1959); Orwell v. Hopkins, 28 Cal. 2d 147, 152, 168 P.2d 972 (1946);
Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 134 P.2d 242 (1943); Cleary, Res Judicata
Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
"I See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit Before Judgment at 6-9, Caulfield v. Hirsch, 436 U.S. 957 (1978) (urging
DAD DE
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overrule an obviously flawed precedent is likely to subvert or evade
it with covert practices, 3 8 Justice Rehnquist would encourage the
sort of obscurantism that produces oversights in the first place.
Finally, Justice Rehnquist would render scholarly criticism of the
Court's work largely irrelevant, for no matter what flaws were uncovered, correction would be sharply curtailed.
Justice Rehnquist has not himself been oblivious to the evils of
judicial oversight. His opinion for the Court in Edelman v. Jordan"'
held that summary affirmances 3 ° and holdings not explicitly discussed in the opinion, even on issues that were briefed, are entitled
to little precedential weight. 31' In addition, his concurring opinion
in Dothardv. Rawlinson3'2 suggests that an argument not made by
counsel can remain available to future litigants if some member of
the Court thinks of it at the time and mentions it in his opinion.
These opinions cannot be reconciled with his later view in
Moneil. An opinion's silence on a key argument or line of authority
is indistinguishable from silence on an entire issue. The opinion in
Monroe demonstrated that most of the legislative history had not
been considered just as the sub silentio character of the opinions
overruled in Edelman indicated that the Eleventh Amendment
issue in those cases had not been fully considered. Indeed, Justice
Rehnquist's Dothard opinion reserved an alternative argument not
raised by the Court or the parties, which he suggested could be the
basis of a later contrary holding on the very issue discussed at length
and squarely decided by the majority. The easiest way to reconcile
Justice Rehnquist's opinions on judicial oversight is to note that in
Edelman and Dothard,but not in Monel, he agreed with the pretermitted argument. Whatever the explanation, his Edelman-Dothard
view clearly provides the better rule. The Court's ultimate obligaCourt to "take into account the additional factual and legal positions advanced by Petitioners," id. at 6, before deciding a similar case in which certiorari had been granted); C. REMBAR,
THE END OF OBscNrrY 45-58, 406-15 (1968) (describing his efforts to get his definition of
obscenity before the Court before any other obscenity cases were decided).
' See K. LLWELLYN, supra note 277, at 25-26 n.17, 256-58; Stone, The MirandaDoctrine
in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 100-01, 168-69.
415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974).
31, For a summary of the present status of summary affirmances, see Washington v.
Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 99 S. Ct. 740, 749 n.20 (1979).
3" See also Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132, 2140 n.8 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., for the

Court).
312433 U.S. 321, 337, 339-40 (1977). See also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org.,
99 S. Ct. 1905, 1929-30 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, J.) (relying on
Monnell's treatment of oversight); City of Columbus v. Leonard, 99 S. Ct. 3097, 3101 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari to review 551 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1977))
(same).
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tion "to say what the law is" 313 requires it to consider every relevant
argument squarely and on the merits, at least once.
The rule that judicial oversights should be corrected when they
,are discovered was easy to apply to the four examples noted earlier. 31 4 The mistaken rule was expressly disapproved and a new rule
substituted in a single opinion. Dombrowski is harder to correct, for
its most important effects have survived repudiation of its specific
rules. Its overbreadth exception was disapproved in Younger v.
315
Harris,
and its general rule that constitutional rights should be
tested in criminal prosecutions was rejected in Steffel v.
Thompson.3 1 6 What remains of Dombrowski is a mistaken sense that
Younger is firmly based in precedent and Steffel is an innovation,
and a set of consequences that are nonetheless real despite the difficulty of tracing them through the twistings of subsequent doctrinal
development. The slight uncertainty concerning the efficacy of declaratory judgments and the availability of injunctions, the prohibition of prospective relief for defendants in pending enforcement
proceedings even if they still face the Young dilemma with respect
to contemplated future violations, the reverse removal power, and
perhaps some collateral consequences of the overblown rhetoric of
Younger v. Harris-theseare the true legacies of Dombrowski.
Still, the Court can repair the most significant damage by announcing that henceforth any plaintiff facing the Young dilemma
shall be entitled to prospective relief. In doing so it would be faithful
to seventy years of its own precedents and to equally longstanding
congressional policy reflected in the uninterrupted existence of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Three-Judge Court Act, and the Declaratory Judgment Act. From this perspective the five Douglas dictum cases, the brief period from Dombrowski to Steffel, and the
remaining gaps between the Younger doctrine and full recognition
of the Young dilemma appear as minor deviations from the scores
of cases relieving plaintiffs from the Young dilemma. And even
those deviations have been products of oversight or disingenuousness. In the whole history of litigation over prospective relief,
only Chief Justice Stone has ever frankly acknowledged the existence of the Young dilemma and argued that other considerations
outweighed the need to relieve from it. 3 ' 7 Whenever the Court has
33 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
See text and notes at notes 278-296 supra.
315401 U.S. 37, 50-52 (1971).
31- 415 U.S. 452, 460-63 (1974).
317AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 600 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) ("prosecutions...
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denied prospective relief, it has ignored the dilemma and assumed
that state remedies were adequate.
I have discussed elsewhere the implications of alternative
means of providing adequate remedies for all plaintiffs facing the
Young dilemma.3 1 The minimum workable corrective action is
clear. First, the Court must end the slight remaining doubt concerning the efficacy of declaratory judgments of unconstitutionality, by
adopting Justice White's concurrence in Steffel. 311 Justice White
argues forcefully that citizens can rely on declaratory judgments
and that state officials are bound by them. There is no reason why
these arguments should not prevail.320
Second, the Court should overrule part of Roe v. Wade.32 1 This
step would be more important and undoubtedly more controversial.
Roe is the only case in which a plaintiff squarely asked the Court
to enjoin prosecutions for future violations without interfering with
his pending prosecutions. The Court refused, without any effort to
analyze the issue, and apparently without recognizing that plaintiff
faced the Young dilemma in a most acute way: with the prosecutor's
attention already focused on him, he had to go to his medical office
every day and decide whether to continue performing abortions.
There are signs of movement towards reconsideration of Roe. In
Wooley v. Maynard,3 21 the Court affirmed injunctions against further prosecution of a plaintiff who had been convicted three times
and had failed to appeal. As I have argued extensively elsewhere, 23
that result is ultimately inconsistent in principle with Roe, for it
distinguishes past from future violations and permits a state defendant to obtain prospective relief from a federal court. This implication was immediately noticed in the lower courts; Wooley was cited
as authority for enjoining additional prosecutions of plaintiffs whose
may

. . .

cause apprehension .

. .

. Such apprehensions and those of others may lead to

changes in business practice to the injury of the alleged lawbreakers. But . . . loss . . .
resulting from such proceedings . . . is damnum absque injuria."); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (Stone, C.J., for the Court) ("Unlike most penal statutes. . . whose
validity can be determined only by running the risk of violation . . . the present statute
provides . . . an independent administrative proceeding.") (dictum); cf. Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 46, 51 (1971) (Black, J., for the Court) (referring, in discussion of overbreadth
exception, to "chilling effect that admittedly can result," but insisting in discussion of general
rule that criminal prosecution generally provided adequate remedy and referring only to
"cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend").
"I Laycock, supra note 5, at 218, 228-31, 237-38.
311415 U.S. 452, 476-78 (1974).
r See Laycock, supra note 5, at 213.
321 410 U.S. 113, 125-27 (1973).
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
3m Laycock, supra note 5, at 212-14.
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earlier prosecutions were still pending.2 4
The Supreme Court has not indicated any awareness of the full
reach of Wooley's logic. Moreover, the Court recently suggested a
bizarre rule that could ultimately be used to limit Wooley's impact,
although the significance of the case is limited because it did not
involve the Young dilemma and did not cite Wooley. Moore v.
Sims 3 5 involved a federal-court challenge to a Texas statute setting
procedures for taking allegedly battered children away from their
parents. The Court held that the plaintiffs' constitutional objections
to the statute's provisions for collection and dissemination of child
abuse information and for ex parte deprivations of custody should
be dismissed because, although those objections were not directly
relevant to related state court litigation, they could be raised there
as permissive counterclaims.3 2 Yet, the Court significantly limited
this holding in an ambiguous response to the dissent's suggestion
that the pending state proceedings were analogous to a pending
traffic ticket-not related in any relevant way to the claims asserted
in the federal case. 32 The Court said the plaintiffs could refrain from
filing counterclaims and "simply obtain a resolution of the pending
proceeding and then file their separate action," apparently in federal court.32 8 This option to return to federal court seems to apply
to the plaintiff's actual claims, but it may apply only to hypothetical claims that even the majority would view as completely unrelated to the state litigation.
Waiting until the conclusion of the state litigation to file their
federal claim would serve no identifiable federalism interest in
Moore. Such a waiting period, however, may be little more than a
serious inconvenience to the plaintiffs there. During the waiting
period, the plaintiffs will be exposed to the risks that more incorrect
or privileged information will be gathered or disseminated and that
ex parte procedures will again be invoked against them. But they
will not have to refrain from constitutionally protected activity to
avoid aggravating those risks. Other applications of Moore might
have more harmful consequences. For example, the Court could
apply the waiting period rule to distinguish Wooley from Roe, by
requiring state defendants to await termination of all litigation over
past violations before seeking relief with respect to future violations.
The result wouldbe to leave such defendants squarely in the Young
32 Eagle Books, Inc. v. Ritchie, 455 F. Supp. 73, 75-76 (D.Utah 1977); Sovereign News
Co. v. Falke, 448 F. Supp. 306, 376-78 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Boe v. Colello, 438 F. Supp. 145,
151-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
3 99 S. Ct. 2371 (1979).
32 Id. at 2378, 2381.
2 Id. at 2383-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 2383 n.14.
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dilemma. Such a distinction has also been criticized on other
grounds."'
Two additional facts color Moore and may limit its implications. The district court had not limited itself to the information
and ex parte seizure issues. It had stayed the pending state litigation for a year and a half while it resolved all foreseeable federal
issues, including those that clearly should have been raised in the
pending state proceedings, such as the procedure and burden of
persuasion to be applied there.3" Thus, the Supreme Court in Moore
was not reviewing a judgment that carefully separated the plaintiffs'
claims and gave reasonable deference to state proceedings while
preserving the plaintiffs' choice of forum for claims independent of
those proceedings. If the Court does review such a judgment in the
future, and if the judgment is supported by careful findings of fact,
a majority might respond with more attention to differences between claims. The Court's failure to consider the dissent's suggestion that the judgment be modified 331 is not encouraging, but a
dissenting opinion is no substitute for a record that properly shapes
the issue.
The second fact that may limit Moore is that the worst harm
to the plaintiff-parents had been limited by a federal district court
order that the children be returned. The Supreme Court did not
review this order, but relied on it to show that further relief had been
unnecessary.3 32 This reliance implies at least some willingness to
treat separate claims separately, as would be required to overrule
Roe and distinguish future from pending prosecutions against the
same litigant. Thus, part of Moore undermines Roe even as other
parts lend it tangential support against the implications of Wooley.
Wooley and Moore neither reaffirm nor overrule Roe, but the questions they raise make the case for its reexamination more compelling.
Finally, there are disputed details of the Younger doctrine that
do not involve the Young dilemma. One of these is Hicks v.
Miranda,m the case that created the reverse removal power. If Roe
v. Wade is overruled, a retaliatory prosecution will not deprive the
federal court of power to take a plaintiff out of the Young dilemma
by enjoining additional prosecutions for any future violations.
Whether the retaliatory prosecution should be allowed to continue
"ILaycock,

supra note 5, at 213-14; Fiss, supra note 17, at 1141-42.
3 Sims v. State Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1185, 1194-95 (S.D. Tex.
1977), rev'd sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 99 S. Ct. 2371 (1979).
=' 99 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2382-83 (opinion of the Court).
422 U.S. 332 (1975).
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is a separate issue, independent of the Young dilemma. Correcting
the oversight in Dombrowski would not logically compel any particular resolution of that issue, although the interests at stake might
be balanced differently in light of a corrected understanding of the
history of prospective relief.
CONCLUSION

Dombrowski is a dramatic example of judicial oversight. The
Court announced a rule that had not been the law for at least two
decades, if ever, that was inconsistent with the overwhelmingly
dominant line of precedent for the previous sixty years, and that the
majority apparently disagreed with as a matter of policy. Because
the mistake went undetected, Dombrowski was greeted as an expansion of the right to prospective relief when in fact it was the opposite. An oversight of this magnitude suggests a need for research
concerning the causes and frequency of similar incidents. Its continuing doctrinal effects require correction. Prospective relief is subject to more restrictions today than it was before Dombrowski, and
the Court has never tested the new restrictions against the full logic
of the Young dilemma and the authority of six decades of forgotten
precedent. It has an obligation to do so.

